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PREFERENCING EDUCATIONAL CHOICE:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
Derek W. Black†
Rapidly expanding charter and voucher programs are establishing a new education paradigm in which access to traditional public schools is no longer guaranteed. In some areas,
charter and voucher programs are on a trajectory to phase out
traditional public schools altogether. This Article argues that
this trend and its effects violate the constitutional right to public education embedded in all fifty state constitutions.
Importantly, this Article departs from past constitutional
arguments against charter and voucher programs. Past arguments have attempted to prohibit such programs entirely and
have assumed, with little evidentiary support, that they endanger statewide education systems. Unsurprisingly, litigation and scholarship based on a flawed premise have thus far
failed to slow the growth of charter and voucher programs.
Without a reframed theory, several recently filed lawsuits are
likely to suffer the same fate.
This Article does not challenge the general constitutionality of choice programs. Instead, the Article identifies two limitations that state constitutional rights to education place on
choice policy. The first limitation is that states cannot preference private choice programs over public education. This conclusion flows from the fact that most state constitutions
mandate public education as a first-order right for their citizens. Thus, while states may establish choice programs, they
cannot systematically advantage choice programs over public
education. This Article demonstrates that some states have
crossed this line.
The second limitation that state constitutions place on
choice programs is that their practical effect cannot impede
educational opportunities in public schools. Education
clauses in state constitutions obligate the state to provide adequate and equitable public schools. Any state policy that deprives students of access to those opportunities is therefore
unconstitutional. Often-overlooked district level data reveals
that choice programs are reducing public education funding,
stratifying opportunity, and intensifying segregation in large
urban centers. Each of these effects represents a distinct constitutional violation.
†
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INTRODUCTION
The rapid expansion of charter and voucher programs is
fundamentally changing the modern education paradigm. In
some areas, these choice programs are re-defining, and indeed

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

R
R

R
R
R
R
R
R
R

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-6\CRN601.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 3

21-NOV-18

PREFERENCING EDUCATIONAL CHOICE

15:00

1361

phasing out, traditional public education. The public schools
in New Orleans, for instance, entirely disappeared in 2014,
with an independent charter school system replacing the centuries-old public system.1 Last year, the public school systems
of Detroit and Flint became majority-charter, with a host of
major school districts in other states set to follow.2 In addition
to charter programs, voucher programs have entered a new era
of vast expansion. The voucher programs in Florida and Indiana more than quadrupled between 2008 and 2015.3 In the
past two years, Arizona and Nevada enacted voucher programs
that would authorize every student in the state to enroll in a
private school at public cost.4 Now, the federal government is
proposing an even more radical change that would affect the
entire nation. The Trump administration’s proposed budget
would make states ineligible for federal funding increases unless they change their laws to allow students to spend the
entirety of state, local, and federal education funds on a school
of their choice.5
Public school advocates have long feared that if charters
and vouchers ever gained a strong foothold in public policy,

1
Lyndsey Layton, In New Orleans, Major School District Closes Traditional
Public Schools for Good, WASH. POST (May 28, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/local/education/in-new-orleans-traditional-public-schools-close-forgood/2014/05/28/ae4f5724-e5de-11e3-8f90-73e071f3d637_story.html [https:/
/perma.cc/3KBD-X3UT].
2
NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., A GROWING MOVEMENT: AMERICA’S LARGEST
CHARTER PUBLIC SCHOOL COMMUNITIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON STUDENT OUTCOMES 3
(2016), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/enroll
ment-share-web1128.pdf [https://perma.cc/T62Z-LRV2] [hereinafter A GROWING
MOVEMENT 2016]; see also Emma Brown, D.C. Council Members Fear Schools Near
Tipping Point as Students Flee System, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/dc-council-members-fear-schoolsnear-tipping-point-as-students-flee-system/2013/01/23/a1e96dfc-659d-11e29e1b-07db1d2ccd5b_story.html [https://perma.cc/MWH5-UDVX] (describing
the growth of charter schools in the District).
3
See infra notes 150–55 and accompanying text.
4
See Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886, 892 (Nev. 2016); Yvonne Wingett
Sanchez & Rob O’Dell, Arizona’s New School-Voucher Program Is on Hold. Now
What? ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/
politics/arizona-education/2017/04/20/arizona-expanding-its-school-voucherempowerment-scholarship-account-program-now-what/100352304/ [https://
perma.cc/4M7U-79ZF].
5
See Scott Sargrad, An Attack on America’s Schools, U.S. NEWS (May 23,
2017), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/articles/2017-05-23
/donald-trump-and-betsy-devos-budget-would-destroy-public-schools [https://
perma.cc/SM3R-U77C] (“In essence, states and districts will have to enact DeVos’
preferred school choice policies in order to recover some of the cuts to longstanding programs.”).
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they would erode the stability of public education itself.6 Yet,
save a few outlier cases, advocates have failed to persuade
courts to halt the choice programs.7 They have argued that
state constitutions bar these choice programs altogether.8
More specifically, they have asserted that education clauses of
state constitutions prohibit states from funding or creating
anything other than traditional public schools. Most courts
have rejected this argument outright, reasoning that charter
schools are public schools and states retain the discretion to
offer vouchers as an alternative to the public system.9 In those
few cases where public school advocates prevailed, states simply created funding mechanisms to avoid the problems that
courts had identified.10 In short, constitutional doctrine has
largely failed to constrain the expansion of choice programs.
The flaw in these early cases was that they claimed too
much. They lacked the evidence to establish these choice programs would actually undermine public education. Instead,
advocates for traditional public education launched attacks
premised on the notion that choice programs were inherently
antithetical to the public education system. Courts, understandably, were unwilling to concur in such a bold claim—a
claim that would halt experimentation before it even began. 11
Whatever the merits of those early claims, a constitutional doctrine has now solidified: states may create and fund choice
programs.12 Revisiting the now well-established doctrine is a
futile effort.
Yet, all doctrine is capable of evolution and nuance. The
failure to pursue them allows the harmful effects of choice to
continue unabated—harms that demand a response. This Ar6
See generally James Forman, Jr., The Rise and Fall of School Vouchers: A
Story of Religion, Race, and Politics, 54 UCLA L. REV. 547, 550–53 (2007) (examining the relationship between religion, race, and school vouchers); Martha Minow,
Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 287 (1999) (examining the
effect of charter schools on public schools).
7
See Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public”
Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 947 (2007).
8
See, e.g., Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 408–11 (Fla. 2006); Meredith v.
Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1221–25 (Ind. 2013).
9
See, e.g., Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 758–60 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999); Pence, 984 N.E.2d at 1221–25.
10
See Hillel Y. Levin, Tax Credit Scholarship Programs and the Changing
Ecology of Public Education, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1052–57 (2013).
11
See, e.g., Wilson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747; see also Nathaniel J. McDonald,
Note, Ohio Charter Schools and Educational Privatization: Undermining the Legacy
of the State Constitution’s Common School Approach, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 467, 469
(2005) (describing school choice reform in Ohio).
12
See Robert J. Martin, Charting the Court Challenges to Charter Schools, 109
PENN. ST. L. REV. 43, 92 (2004); Saiger, supra note 7, at 968–69.
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ticle offers that response. The response requires a reframing of
both the facts and legal theories surrounding the issue. The
facts that matter most are not statewide but local. Choice programs appear small at the state level and have little to no effect
on most school districts.13 Complaining about these effects is
unreasonable. A narrowed focus reveals that the effects of
statewide policy are concentrated in particular urban districts.14 From the perspective of the local urban district, the
effects range from existential threats to serious impediments to
equal and adequate education.
In Newark, New Jersey, for instance, the state’s arcane
system of funding charters produces a funding deficit in the
school district with each student who transfers to charter.15 To
be clear, the Newark school district does not just lose its state
funding for those students to the charter school; rather, the
state requires the district to send charters an amount in excess
of what the district received from the state.16 This funding
mechanism, then, clearly decreases funds available for students remaining in public schools. As social science, legislative
studies, and states’ own statutes all confirm, the shrinking
education pot and flawed charter funding mechanisms are depressing per-pupil funding in several districts at a rate that can
seriously depress educational opportunities and academic
achievement.17 In short, by developing district-level data, this
Article demonstrates public school advocates’ worst fears:
choice is draining funds from public schools.
The legal theory that makes these facts relevant is one that
accepts the established principle that states may fund choice
programs but emphasizes that no constitutional principle au13
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION (2017), https://
nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgb.asp [https://perma.cc/DFY9-MY28].
14
See infra notes 196–216 and accompanying text.
15
DANIELLE FARRIE & MONETE JOHNSON, EDUC. L. CTR., NEWARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
BUDGET IMPACTS OF UNDERFUNDING AND RAPID CHARTER GROWTH 6 (2015), http://
edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/publications/NPS%20Budget%20Impacts
%20of%20Underfunding%20and%20Rapid%20Charter%20Growth.pdf [https://
perma.cc/32HF-ADKU].
16
Id.
17
C. Kirabo Jackson et al., The Effects of School Spending on Educational and
Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms, 131 Q.J. ECON. 157,
162 (2016); Christopher A. Candelaria & Kenneth A. Shores, Court-Ordered Finance Reforms in the Adequacy Era: Heterogeneous Causal Effects and Sensitivity,
STAN. CTR. FOR EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS (2017), https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/cofr-efp.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2YS-3S6B]; STATE OF KAN. LEGIS. DIV.
OF POST AUDIT, COST STUDY ANALYSIS: ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN KANSAS: ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF K-12 EDUCATION USING TWO APPROACHES (2006), http:/
/www.kslpa.org/assets/files/reports/05pa19a.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BDP2FSQ].
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thorizes the state to implement those programs in ways that
harm the public education system. In other words, the theory
introduces limitations on choice programs without challenging
their basic existence. This means states must implement
choice programs in ways that, as a practical matter, do not
undermine public education.
This Article examines two questions under this simple constitutional test for choice programs. First, it examines whether
states may create statutory preferences for private education.
Second, it examines whether choice programs actually cause
educational deprivations in particular school districts that
would rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
As to the first question, states may not favor choice programs over the traditional public education systems. This limitation flows from the fact that education holds first-order
status in most state constitutions and is an absolute obligation
in others.18 This should be interpreted to mean that states
cannot systematically advantage choice programs in relation to
public education. This Article’s close examination of statutory
frameworks reveals states are crossing this line in a variety of
ways: funding, oversight, student and teacher rights, and enrollment practices. Legislative preferences for charters are so
strong that charters can, for instance, engage in business deals
that would constitute fraud if carried out by traditional public
schools.19 Similarly, with vouchers, states simply turn over
students and money with almost no strings attached.20
Voucher schools remain free to discriminate, minimize special

18
See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of
the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing
within its borders.”); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, ¶ I (“The provision of an adequate
public education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of
Georgia. . . . [The expense of that] shall be provided for by taxation.”); NEV. CONST.
art. XII, § 6 (requiring the state to fund education before any other program).
19
Preston C. Green, III et al., Are Charter Schools the Second Coming of
Enron?: An Examination of the Gatekeepers That Protect Against Dangerous Related-Party Transactions in the Charter School Sector, 93 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2018); see also Thomas A. Kelley, III, North Carolina Charter Schools’ (Non-?)
Compliance with State and Federal Nonprofit Law, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1757, 1790–91
(2015) (concluding that charters, while claiming non-profit status, likely do not
meet the federal criteria but are being allowed to claim as much under North
Carolina law).
20
See generally NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, SCHOOL VOUCHER LAWS: STATE
BY STATE COMPARISON (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/voucherlaw-comparison.aspx [https://perma.cc/U4AT-6R4Y] (noting variations in state
law in regard to vouchers).
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education services, squelch free speech, and expel students.21
States do not even demand increased academic achievement in
return.
As to the second question, education clauses in state constitutions create a state duty to provide adequate and equitable
public schools.22 Any state policy that deprives students of
access to those educational opportunities is unconstitutional.23 State choice policies are no exception. The issue,
then, is whether those choice policies do, in fact, cause harms
to public education. The answer is demonstrably yes. Districtlevel data demonstrates that choice programs are reducing
public education funding, stratifying opportunity, and intensifying segregation.24 Each of these categorical effects represents a distinct constitutional violation.
This Article is particularly timely. The nation is locked in a
debate over the future of education reform and choice’s role in
it.25 While federal and state governments have implemented
and discarded a variety of new education reforms over the last
two decades,26 choice programs have stuck and expanded. As
Martha Minow aptly wrote, choice has a “seductive” allure.27
At the same time, choice programs are introducing enormous
risks to public education. Understandably, proponents and
opponents take extreme positions on the issue, producing polemic rhetoric rather than reasoned debate. 28 This Article
21
See, e.g., Vanessa Ann Countryman, Note, School Choice Programs Do Not
Render Participant Private Schools “State Actors,” 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 525, 527
(2004); Michael Kavey, Note, Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment
Right to Discriminate, 113 YALE L.J. 743, 746–50 (2003).
22
See generally Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher
Tenure, 104 CAL. L. REV. 75, 114–15 (2016) (synthesizing state constitutional
doctrine on education).
23
See id.
24
See infra notes 196–238 and accompanying text.
25
See David Leonhardt, School Vouchers Aren’t Working, But Choice Is, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/opinion/schoolvouchers-charters-betsy-devos.html [https://perma.cc/UZ49-PVY7]; Nicholas
Kristof, Beyond Education Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/nicholas-kristof-beyond-educationwars.html [https://perma.cc/L33T-XXK4].
26
See generally Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education:
The Every Student Succeeds Act, 105 CAL. L. REV. 101, 108–30 (2017) (surveying
the history of education reform at the federal level).
27
Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and
American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 816 (2011).
28
See generally Jay Mathews, School Choice Debate v. Reality, WASH. POST
(May 31, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/class-struggle/post/
school-ch. . .te-vs-reality/2011/05/31/AG5OMkFH_blog.html [https://
perma.cc/QC43-WSYH] (indicating that school choice debates are driven more by
personal conclusions than research).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-6\CRN601.txt

1366

unknown

Seq: 8

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

21-NOV-18

15:00

[Vol. 103:1359

identifies a nuanced middle ground that would harmonize legitimate charter and voucher interests with the states’ obligations to the traditional public education system.
In addition, each new wave of choice expansion generates a
new wave of litigation. A number of lawsuits have been filed in
just the last year.29 These cases, however, will not stall the
momentum of choice programs if the cases continue to argue
that choice programs are in and of themselves unconstitutional. This Article proposes a workable means to challenge the
reach of choice programs, setting practical limitations on their
implementation. It also offers guidance to courts in evaluating
choice programs without calling for wholesale reversals of the
now-established precedent that upholds their constitutionality. In short, this Article offers a reasoned solution to the danger that choice programs pose that is consistent with existing
constitutional principles.
This Article makes its argument in four parts. Part I canvases states’ choice statutes, identifying the ways in which
states have created advantages for choice programs in relation
to traditional public schools. It also examines recent policy
developments, concluding that further expansion and advantages for choice are coming. Part II reveals that the effects of
school choice are best understood at the district level. Its empirical analysis details how the effects of choice are concentrated in particular districts. Part II ends by identifying and
categorizing the most pernicious effects of current choice programs: lowered school quality, stratification of educational opportunity, and segregation. Part III provides an overview of the
constitutional principles that apply in education equity and
quality cases and critically evaluates past litigation’s failure to
properly use them in the context of choice programs. Part IV
proposes a new constitutional analysis and identifies two major
29
See, e.g., Kristen M. Clark, Broward Schools to Sue over Controversial New
Schools Law, MIAMI HERALD (July 5, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/
local/education/article159791149.html [https://perma.cc/3VP5-5R63]; Lori
Higgins, Education Groups Sue to Stop Private School Funding in Michigan, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.freep.com/story/news/education/
2017/03/21/michigan-private-school-lawsuit-funding/99440894/ [https://
perma.cc/ZV6G-JMHG]; Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona Legislature Leaves, and Lawsuits
Start: Group Targets Limits on Ballot Initiatives, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (May 11, 2017),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/legislature/2017/05/12/ari
zona-legislature-leaves-and-lawsuits-start-group-targets-limits-ballot-initiatives
/319045001/ [https://perma.cc/N8Z4-P9C9]; Kate Royals, Judge: Local Tax Dollars Crux of Charter School Lawsuit, MISS. TODAY (Apr. 4, 2017), https://mississip
pitoday.org/2017/04/04/judge-local-tax-dollars-crux-of-charter-school-laws
uit/ [https://perma.cc/72YF-VEBF].
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limiting principles that courts should apply to choice
programs.
I
PREFERENCING CHOICE BY LAW
A. Charter Schools
1. State Funding Policies
Charter advocates have long claimed that charters are underfunded in comparison to traditional public schools. 30
While there may have been some truth to the claim in earlier
years, states have increasingly treated charter schools very
well, if not more favorably, than traditional public schools in
the last decade. The complexity of school funding in any given
state, along with variances between states, can obscure this
point.
States follow a couple of different patterns in funding charter schools. Some fund charters directly from the state coffers,
with none of the funds passing through local districts.31
Others route charter funding through local school district
budgets, with the districts serving as pass-through entities.32
Among those that route state funds through districts, some
also require the district to transfer a pro-rata share of locally
raised education funds to charters.33 The extent to which a
state reimburses local districts for the transfer of local tax dollars to charters varies.34
Notwithstanding these variances, at least three trends reveal a distinct advantage for charter schools in several states:
the rate of increase or decrease in per-pupil funding, inflated
reimbursement rates, and phantom revenue. The rate of increase in charter funding is the most obvious. The expenditures for charter schools have steadily increased over the past
several years. As the chart below reveals, for instance, Ohio
charter schools received substantial funding increases every
year between 2008 and 2015—ranging anywhere from two to
30
See, e.g., Jeanette M. Curtis, Note, A Fighting Chance: Inequities in Charter
School Funding and Strategies for Achieving Equal Access to Public School Funds,
55 HOW. L.J. 1057, 1058 (2012); Greg Rubio, Surviving Rodriguez: The Viability of
Federal Equal Protection Claims by Underfunded Charter Schools, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1643, 1644 (2008).
31
See Deborah A. Verstegen & Teresa S. Jordan, A Fifty-State Survey of
School Finance Policies and Programs: An Overview, 34 J. EDUC. FIN. 213, 215–17
(2009).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
See id.
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more than ten times the rate of increase in traditional public
schools.35
FIGURE 1
PERCENT CHANGE IN OHIO PER-PUPIL FUNDING
15.00%
10.00%

Charter
School

5.00%
Traditional
Public
School

0.00%
-5.00%
-10.00%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

These funding practices produced even deeper disparities
when the method of charter funding is examined. Ohio filters
charter money through districts, which sometimes must transfer more to charters than they actually receive per-pupil from
the state.36 In 2013–14, the base per-pupil grant to districts
was $3,890, but the transfer to charters exceeded that amount
and meant that statewide districts lost $256 for every student
that enrolled in a charter.37 In a number of districts, the loss
was much larger. In nine districts, the loss amounted to a 20%
to 65% cut in per-pupil state funding for traditional public
schools.38 At the same time, the state funding per charter
school students was $7,189 per pupil—twice the state support
for traditional public school students.39
35
The data for this chart comes from Ohio Dep’t of Educ., Enrollment Data,
http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Data/Frequently-Requested-Data/Enroll
ment-Data [https://perma.cc/PWF4-WDMD], and William L. Phillis, Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of School Funding, Document C: Charter Schools’
Impact on Net State Funding to Traditional School districts and Other Fiscal Data
Related to Charter Schools, Testimony on House Bill 2 (Mar. 9, 2015), http://ohio
coalition.org/listings.php?category=machining&listing=1 [https://perma.cc/
89GQ-VY39].
36
INNOVATION OHIO, SHORT-CHANGED: HOW POOR-PERFORMING CHARTERS COST ALL
OHIO KIDS (2014) [hereinafter SHORT-CHANGED].
37
Id.
38
ARIZ. SENATE RES. STAFF, ARIZONA’S SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM 3–4 (2016),
https://www.azleg.gov/briefs/Senate/ARIZONA%27S%20SCHOOL%20FINAN
CE%20SYSTEM.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK77-RSBM] [hereinafter A RIZONA’S
SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM].
39
SHORT-CHANGED, supra note 36, at 3.
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Ohio is not unique. Similar trends occurred in several
other states, just with different nuances. In Arizona and New
Jersey, the state spared charter schools most of the funding
cuts that the states imposed on traditional public schools during the recession. In New Jersey, the state refused to fully fund
its statutory mechanism for calculating the cost of adequate
educational opportunities in public schools.40 Charter schools
were subject to this formula as well, but the state appropriated
separate funds outside the formula to ensure charters received
necessary funding.41 In raw dollars, charters received $1,000
to $2,000 more per pupil per year than traditional public
schools in base state aid between 2013 and 2016. 42 In short,
the state sought to maintain adequate funding for charters at
the time that it was depriving traditional public schools of it.
In Arizona, the state imposed similar cuts to its per-pupil
formula every year between 2008 and 2011, but the cuts to
traditional public schools were far larger than charters.43 During those years, Arizona collectively cut a total of $700 per
pupil from traditional public schools but only $141 from
charters.44
FIGURE 2
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See Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1025–26 (N.J. 2011).
FARRIE & JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 6.
42
Id. at 6–7.
43
YOUSEF AWWAD, STATE OF ARIZ., DEP’T OF EDUC., FUNDING OF DISTRICTS VERSUS
CHARTERS (2010), https://ade.az.gov/schoolfinance/faqs/Funding/Funding%20
of%20Districts%20vs%20Charters.pdf [http://perma.cc/DD5D-5KFE].
44
Calculations based on finance data in FUNDING OF DISTRICTS VERSUS CHARTERS, id., and student enrollment in ARIZ. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL FINANCE, http://
www.azed.gov/finance/reports/ [http://perma.cc/4ZSF-D9X6] (last visited July
27, 2017).
41
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Like New Jersey, Arizona also found creative ways to offset
the cuts that charters would have otherwise felt. One was
maintaining a funding formula bump for districts with less
than 600 students. Because the state treats each charter as its
own district, 90% of charters fall in this category.45 Another
was placing a larger tax burden on local districts to offset cuts
in state aid.46 Since charters do not raise local taxes, they were
exempted from this burden.47 More obvious, the state simply
directed new non-formula funds toward charters that were unavailable to traditional public schools.48
The second categorical preference for charter schools occurs in states that set charter reimbursement rates that
overcompensate charters for the services they provide. Cyber
charter schools—schools that provide services primarily
through the internet—are the worst example. Some states
fund cyber charter schools the same as brick and mortar charter schools,49 even though cyber charters do not have the facilities costs of other charter and public schools.50 While cyber
schools do have higher technology costs, those costs do not
justify funding them at the same level as other charters.51 Recognizing this problem, other states fund cyber charters at a
lower level,52 but the question of overcompensation still re45

R

46

R

AWWAD, supra note 43.
ARIZONA’S SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM, supra note 38, at 3–4.
47
Id.
48
AWWAD, supra note 43.
49
INNOVATION OHIO, OHIO’S E-SCHOOLS: FUNDING FAILURE; CODDLING CONTRIBUTORS 4–5 (2011), http://innovationohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/
IO.051211.eschools.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QYL-A3PC] [hereinafter OHIO’S ESCHOOLS]; PA. SCH. BDS. ASS’N EDUC. RES. & POL’Y CTR., THE COSTS OF CHARTER AND
CYBER CHARTER SCHOOLS: RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR PENNSYLVANIA
SCHOOL DISTRICTS 11 (2014), https://www.psba.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
09/Charter_School_Funding-White-Paper_Update_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/
N3H8-E7DU] [hereinafter COSTS OF CHARTER].
50
COSTS OF CHARTER, supra note 49, at 11; OHIO’S E-SCHOOLS, supra note 49,
at 5.
51
See OHIO’S E-SCHOOLS, supra note 49, at 6 (projecting a significant profit
margin in online charters); see also NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., A CALL TO
ACTION TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF FULL-TIME VIRTUAL CHARTER PUBLIC SCHOOLS 11–12
(2016) [hereinafter CALL TO ACTION] (comparing brick and mortar costs to online
costs).
52
See, e.g., State Charter Sch. Comm’n, State Charter Funding, https://
scsc.georgia.gov/state-charter-funding [http://perma.cc/U3WV-AGVR] (last visited Aug. 4, 2017) (reducing virtual charters funding by one-third); see generally
GREG S. GRIFFIN & LESLIE MCGUIRE, GA. DEP’T OF AUDITS & ACCOUNTS PERFORMANCE
AUDIT DIV., VIRTUAL CHARTER SCHOOLS: REQUESTED INFORMATION ON VIRTUAL CHARTER
SCHOOLS 33–34 (2016), https://www.edweek.org/media/georgia%2015-11%20
virtual%20charter%20final%20report.pdf [http://perma.cc/EW9J-Q9W4].
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mains.53 In Georgia, for instance, cyber charters’ state perpupil funding is less that other charters, but their direct perpupil state revenue still exceeds that of traditional public
schools.54 The choice industry itself even recognizes the problem. Fearing the negative taint this issue and fraud may have
on charters overall, the industry issued a report advocating for
states to reform cyber charter funding to better account for
student costs.55
Overcompensation of brick and mortar charters is harder
to identify, but present nonetheless. The best documented example is in Pennsylvania. There, the state calculates charter
school reimbursement rates largely based on the average perpupil expenditures in the local school district in which the
charter is based.56 The problem is that district averages lump
a lot of apples and oranges together, about which the state
makes false assumptions.57 Pennsylvania’s reimbursement
rate for special education students assumes that all special
education students cost the same or, even if they do not, charters will enroll a diverse group of special education. Both are
false.
Students with mild disabilities may only require small additional investments beyond the cost of regular education students, but a student with autism may cost multiple times
more.58 Pennsylvania’s statutory reimbursement for specialeducation-students rate ignores this distinction and simply requires reimbursement based on averages. The reimbursement
rate “does not vary based on the charter schools’ actual costs
or on the needs of the child.”59 Consider Morrisville Borough,
for instance, where the reimbursement for regular education
53
OHIO’S E-SCHOOLS, supra note 49, at 6 (projecting a significant profit margin
in online charters).
54
Press Release, David Werner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Legislative and
External Affairs, Ga. Charter Sch. Ass’n, Governor’s Office Presents Analysis of
Charter School Funding (Aug. 14, 2012), http://gacharters.org/press-releases/
governors-office-presents-analysis-of-charter-school-funding/ [http://perma.cc/
UZ2E-6VPL].
55
CALL TO ACTION, supra note 51, at 6.
56
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 17-1725-A (2018).
57
See generally COSTS OF CHARTER, supra note 49, at 6–9 (analyzing per-pupil
spending).
58
See AUGENBLICK, PALAICH & ASSOCIATES, N.J. DEP’T OF EDUC., ANALYSIS OF NEW
JERSEY’S CENSUS-BASED SPECIAL EDUCATION FUNDING SYSTEM 6 (2011); MICHAEL GRIFFITH, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, A LOOK AT FUNDING FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
4–5 (2015). See also Amanda M. Fairbanks, Tug of War over Costs to Educate the
Autistic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at A28 (examining additional costs for students with autism).
59
Chester Upland Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania, 284 F.R.D. 305, 314 (E.D. Pa.
2012).
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students was $11,000 per pupil and $42,642 for special education students.60 The latter was likely driven up because the
district is relatively small and has a few extremely high cost
special education students. A local charter school, however,
would receive the high reimbursement no matter how small the
needs of the special education students it enrolls. While the
specific demographics in Morrisville are beyond the scope of
this Article, research demonstrates charters do generally enroll
lower-cost special education students.61 Given that analogously high reimbursement rates repeat themselves across
Pennsylvania,62 overcompensation is likely prevalent.
Separate analysis further reveals that the special education average itself is artificially inflated. This occurs because
the state does not calculate the average based on the actual
number of special education students in a district but rather
on the assumption that 16% of students are in special education in all districts.63 In a district with more than 16%, the
state’s calculation method significantly inflates the average
special expenditure. 64 The result is to then require districts to
spend more on special education students in charter schools
than they do on their own special education students. This
phenomenon was so prevalent in Chester that the district was
nearly insolvent and forced to close in 2012. 65
The final categorical financial advantage for charters is the
phantom revenue that charters receive when districts are required to provide services like transportation and extracurricular activities for charters. Pennsylvania’s statute indicates that
school districts are required to provide transportation to a
charter school located up to ten miles from the school district
60
See PENN. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING, http://
www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter%20Schools/Pages/Charter-School-Fund
ing.aspx#tab-1 [https://perma.cc/FP7C-JXFX] (last visited Oct. 18, 2017), for
2016–17 tuition rates.
61
See MARK WEBER & JULIA SASS RUBIN, NEW JERSEY CHARTER SCHOOLS: A DATADRIVEN VIEW, PART I 21–22 (2014); Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture Clash: Special
Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 686–87 (2012); Anne E. Trotter
et al., Education Management Organizations and Charter Schools: Serving All Students, 213 EDUC. L. REP. 935, 943 (2006); See also Robert J. Martin, Charter
School Accessibility for Historically Disadvantaged Students: The Experience in
New Jersey, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 327, 358 (2004) (examining students who enroll
in charter schools).
62
The reimbursement rate for regular education in the vast majority of Pennsylvania districts was between $9,000 and $13,000 per pupil. But, the reimbursement rate for special education students in most districts ranged from
$16,000 per pupil to the low $30,000 range. PENN. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 60.
63
Chester, 284 F.R.D. at 315.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 305.
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boundary,66 which could mean beyond the district boundary.
Ohio ignores district boundaries altogether and simply obligates the district to transport charter students who live within
a 30-minute radius of the charter school.67 Extracurricular
activity rules are more straightforward: states require school
districts to allow charter school students to participate in their
extracurricular activities as though they were enrolled in the
district.68 To be clear, charter students should have access to
transportation and extracurricular activities. The point here is
simply that the cost of those opportunities is placed on local
districts, not on charters that would otherwise have to carry
those costs themselves.
In sum, each of these trends represents a distinct preference for private choice. Whatever their historical access to
funds, charters have seen a rate of per-pupil funding growth
that far outstrips public schools. That growth has occurred
even when the state has cut funds for traditional public schools
and sometimes included taking it out of local district coffers.
The funds that states have sent to charters, moreover, sometimes overcompensate them, allowing them to reap a financial
windfall from public revenues.69 This is to say nothing of the
phantom revenues that charters receive through in-kind
services.
2. Oversight, Management, and Self-Dealing
The management and oversight advantages that charter
schools have are explicit in most instances. Charters, by design, are free from extensive oversight and accountability.70 At
the most basic level, charters do not collect the same data as
66
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 17-1726-A(a) (2018). In Pennsylvania, if the district
fails to do so, the costs the charter incurs to transport those students are transferred from the district’s state funds. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 17-1726-A(b), (c)
(2018).
67
2014 Ohio Charter Law Guidebook, OHIO ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS.
(Sept. 2014), http://oapcs.org/oapcs-charter-school-law-guidebook/ [https://
perma.cc/XW56-2AHK].
68
Id.; see generally S.C. CODE, §§ 59-40-10–59-40-240 (2016).
69
See BRUCE BAKER & GARY MIRON, NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR., THE BUSINESS OF
CHARTER SCHOOLING: UNDERSTANDING THE POLICIES THAT CHARTER OPERATORS USE FOR
FINANCIAL BENEFIT 42–43 (2015); See also Erik Kain, 80% of Michigan Charter
Schools Are For-Profits, FORBES (Sept. 29, 2011, 11:51 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/09/29/80-of-michigan-charter-schoolsare-for-profits/ [https://perma.cc/ML7U-PUHX] (describing the “corporate takeover” of public education).
70
Michael A. Naclerio, Note, Accountability Through Procedure? Rethinking
Charter School Accountability and Special Education Rights, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
1153, 1157 (2017).
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public schools, make it publicly available, or have to account
for it.71 Therein lies the point. Education reformers have long
argued that public schools are over-regulated, and the key to
innovation was alleviating that burden. 72 The irony, however,
is that charter schools were freed of these so-called burdens,
not traditional public schools.
Charter school accountability is largely limited to the contract that they enter into with a charter school authorizer (the
entity states created or authorized to issue charters).73 This
contract can be as rigorous or lenient as the charters that
submit it and the authorizers who accept it decide.74 Once the
authorizer grants a charter, oversight typically declines.
Whereas a traditional public school remains under constant
oversight from publicly elected boards, superintendents, and
high-ranking state officials,75 charters generally are not. The
only formal checks on most charters are their self-selected
board of directors and the charter authorizers. But neither the
directors nor the authorizers are obligated to exercise any particular control over the charter.76 Thus, as a practical matter,
they exercise very little control.
Prior studies show that charter oversight is simply insufficient to ensure basic compliance with the charter and other
prevailing laws.77 The pressure on authorizers has been to
71
See, e.g., id. at 1184–85; Jacey Fortin, What’s Next in the Charter Debate?
Start with Better Data, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.
com/opinion/columns/2016/11/15/what-next-charter-debate-start-with-better
-data/7qbRqT4oVHXXXpCBFR9aiN/story.html [https://perma.cc/86UA-YF6J].
72
See Walker Richmond, Charter School Accountability: Rhetoric, Results, and
Ramifications, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 330, 339 (2004).
73
Id. at 340–41.
74
See Kelley, III, supra note 19, at 1802 (discussing sweeps contracts); see
also Richmond, supra note 72, at 343–45 (discussing the ambiguity in state
statutes regarding what authorizers must demand of charters).
75
Placing charters outside the highest authorities in the state has created
some controversy as it is not clear whether legislatures have the power to do so in
some states. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.710.020 (West 2016) (indicating that
charters shall be “[o]perated separately from the common school system”); Derek
Black, New Lawsuit Argues Mississippi’s Charter School Law Is Unconstitutional
by Molly Hunter, EDUC. L. PROF. BLOG (July 28, 2016), http://lawprofessors.type
pad.com/education_law/2016/07/new-lawsuit-argues-mississippis-charterschool-law-is-unconstitutional-by-molly-hunter.html [https://perma.cc/DQ6ZUEKQ].
76
Richmond, supra note 72, at 343–45.
77
See, e.g., Rebecca E. Blanton, California Charter Oversight: Key Elements
and Actual Costs, CA. ST. LIBR., Jan. 2012, at 1–2, https://files.eric.ed.gov/
fulltext/ED528991.pdf [https://perma.cc/56ZZ-HXEB] (concluding that “California charter authorizers vary in their adherence to these standards” although
widely accepted standards are present); PATRICK J. HOWARD, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ED-OIG/A02M0012, NATIONWIDE ASSESSMENT OF CHARTER
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issue more charters, not regulate the ones they have.78 Even a
report favorable to charters recognized that “authorizers are
reluctant to actualize the accountability/autonomy exchange
by closing schools for failure to meet their performance
targets.”79 Likewise, a legislative study of California charters
found “authorizers varied widely in both the services they performed[,] the amounts they charged charter schools for oversight[,]”80 and the extent to which they conform to
“professionally-accepted standards.”81 The oversight data produced by authorizers was so limited that the legislative body
indicated that it could not even fully complete the study’s analysis.82 A U.S. Department of Education audit found similar
problems, but went further finding that two out of three charters had “internal control weaknesses” relating to “conflicts of
interest, related-party transactions, and insufficient segregation of duties”83 that risked “waste, fraud, and abuse.”84
As hinted in these reports, charter school flexibility extends well beyond freedom from outside bureaucracies and
politics. States have exempted charters from a number of basic
fiscal expenditure and contracting rules that allow them to
operate largely free of any ethical or business limits other than
those they self-impose.85 The most minor exemptions allow
charters schools to run cash surpluses that school districts
EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS: FINAL AUDIT REPORT (2016), https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2016/a02m0012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JUF2-DH4E] (suggesting that internal control weaknesses are
preventing compliance).
78
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., States Open to Charters Start Fast
in ‘Race to Top’ (June 8, 2009), www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/states-opencharters-start-fast-race-top [https://perma.cc/8EGQ-RGMV].
79
Carol Ascher et al., Charter School Accountability in New York: Findings
from a Three-Year Study of Charter School Authorizers, INST. FOR EDUC. & SOC.
POL’Y, Mar. 2003, at 3.
80
Blanton, supra note 77, at 1.
81
Id. at 1–2.
82
Id. at 2.
83
Howard, supra note 77, at 2.
84
Id. The National Association of Charter School Authorizers itself issued a
2016 report and was only willing to characterize twenty-nine states as having
legal structures to promote effective oversight by authorizers. NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, ON THE ROAD TO GREAT CHARTER SCHOOLS: STATE POLICY ANALYSIS 6–9 (2016).
85
See generally Julia L. Davis, Contracts, Control and Charter Schools: The
Success of Charter Schools Depends on Stronger Nonprofit Board Oversight to
Preserve Independence and Prevent Domination by For-Profit Management Companies, 2011 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1, 11–18 (2011); Green, III et al., supra note 19, at
14.
AND
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cannot, 86 or tap into districts’ rainy day funds and spend them
immediately on discretionary items.87 The more serious exemptions allow charters to hide their expenditures and engage
in what many term as self-dealing with public funds.88
State and federal law require the charter school itself to be
non-profit,89 but the charter remains free to contract out the
entirety of their responsibilities to third-party entities.90 These
third parties are, in many instances, for-profit.91 In other
words, Columbia Academy Charter School may technically
hold the government charter to provide education to 400 elementary students, but once it receives the charter, it enters
into a contract with a for-profit management company that
provides all of the services. If the charter and the for-profit
company were entirely independent, the contracts between
them may not raise serious issues, but evidence from the past
decade has shown this is not always the case.
Preston Green has documented a number of what he terms
related-party transactions, meaning that the charter and the
management company are affiliated in some respect.92 The
charter operates as a shell entity that funnels public money to
for-profit entities that otherwise would not be able to access the
money.93 To be clear, however, a nefarious relationship need
not exist for problems to occur. The very act of the chartering
entity surrendering most of its responsibility to private, forprofit-industry poses a serious risk that the management company profits from public education with little if any oversight
and accountability.
86
Court Rejects Commissioner’s Decision to Allow Charters to Carry Excess
Surplus Funds, EDUC. L. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.edlawcenter.org/news/
archives/school-funding/court-rejects-commissioners-decision-to-allow-char
ters-to-carry-excess-surplus-funds.html [https://perma.cc/Z56Q-G76H].
87
Charter Day Sch., Inc. v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 754 S.E.2d 229,
231–37 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014); Northeast Raleigh Charter Acad., Inc. v. Wake Cty.
Bd. of Educ., No. COA13–697, 2014 WL 640976, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb.18,
2014).
88
Green, III et al., supra note 19, at 18.
89
See Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Schs. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1003 (9th
Cir. 2006).
90
Green, III et al., supra note 19, at 49.
91
Id.
92
Preston Green, III, Is Charter School Fraud the Next Enron?, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 27, 2017, 9:50 PM), http://theconversation.com/is-charter-schoolfraud-the-next-enron-74020 [https://perma.cc/75RS-UUJ9].
93
Id.; see also Marian Wang, When Charter Schools Are Nonprofit in Name
Only, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/when-char
ter-schools-are-nonprofit-in-name-only [https://perma.cc/QMP5-EG9G].
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Analyzing North Carolina charter schools documents and
reports, Thomas Kelley revealed that a private for-profit entity,
National Heritage Academies (NHA), managed several charters
in the state under a “sweeps” contract.94 Under these sweeps
contracts, nearly every public dollar that was deposited into a
charter’s bank account was “instantaneously swept out” and
“deposited into NHA’s.”95 NHA became responsible for every
single aspect of running the charter school—everything from
hiring teachers to acquiring real estate, furniture, and equipment.96 Any money left over was NHA’s to keep as a management fee.97 NHA and other private entities in North Carolina
deposit “millions of public dollars into [their] own coffers every
year and reveal[ ] little about precisely how that money is spent
and how much of it goes to corporate profits rather than the
provision of public education.”98
Kelley, however, seemed to unearth significant profit in the
real estate agreements these private entities negotiated. The
management companies “obtain[ed] ownership of valuable
properties using public funds and charge[d] charter-holding
nonprofits rent (possibly above-market rent) long after their
acquisition-related debts are paid off.”99 The sweeps contract,
however, gives even the well-intentioned charter almost no
power to do anything about it. As litigation in Ohio challenging
these contracts revealed, state statutes often authorize this
exact type of profiteering.100
Critics of charters often point to these management and
oversight details as evidence of why charters are bad policy.101
They may or may not be correct. The point of this Article is not
to offer a per se critique of charters but to clearly identify the
advantages that they and those who operate them have. Flexibility and minimizing bureaucracy may, in fact, produce benefits for public education. But, to the extent those benefits exist,
94

Kelley, III, supra note 19, at 1802.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1802–03.
98
Id. at 1815.
99
Id.
100
Hope Acad. Broadway Campus v. White Hat Mgmt., 46 N.E.3d 665, 668–77
(Ohio 2015).
101
See, e.g., Patrick J. Gallo, Jr., Reforming the “Business” of Charter Schools
in Pennsylvania, 2014 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 207, 207 (2014) (characterizing the
profit motivated opportunities in the charter school movement as a modern day
“gold rush”); Naclerio, supra note 70, at 1153 (arguing that the lack of democratic
responsiveness frustrates the purpose of the charter school authorization
statutes).
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states have directed the benefits to charters, not traditional
public schools. Traditional public education continues to operate under traditional rules. This disparity represents a preference for private choice over public education.
3. Teachers
Teacher salaries consume 80% of public school budgets
and an equally large share of administrative tasks.102 This
huge swath of the education enterprise operates under an entirely different set in charter schools. Charters are largely exempt from the numerous state and federal laws that seek to
ensure that teachers are competent and public schools treat
them fairly.103 To the extent that those protections benefit students, one might argue that charter school exemptions are not
an advantage at all. Yet, the point here is not that charters are
or are not substantively better, but that states have devised
policies that preference charters as an institution over public
schools. Charters as an institution are free from the burdens
of hiring, retaining, and monitoring staff that can meet state
quality controls.104 Likewise, charters can more easily terminate teachers at their discretion.105 In these respects, charters
102

See Wyoming v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d 518, 540 (Wyo. 2001).
See, e.g., Pilsen Wellness Ctr., 359 N.L.R.B. 626, at 628 (2013) (holding
that a private, nonprofit educational services corporation that employs teachers
for a charter school is not a political subdivision of the State of Illinois); Chi.
Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. 455, at 460 (2012)
(determining that a nonprofit corporation that operates a Chicago public charter
school is not a political subdivision of the State of Illinois); Tipka v. Lincoln
Int’l Charter Sch., 864 N.W.2d 371, 371–75 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that
laws affecting public employees do not apply to charter school employees); Kate
Gallen, Comment, The Role of the Judiciary in Charter Schools’ Policies, 77 MO. L.
REV. 1121, 1127 (2012); Automatic Exemptions from Many State and District Laws
and Regulations, NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., http://www.publiccharters.
org/law-database/automatic-exemptions-state-district-laws-regulations/
[https://perma.cc/MNL9-EF6V] [hereinafter Automatic Exemptions] (showing that
collective bargaining does not apply).
104
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-50 (2004) (permitting uncertified teachers
in South Carolina schools); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-60 (2004) (leaving compliance
with teacher regulations to discretion of charter). See also Joshua M. Cowen &
Marcus A. Winters, Do Charters Retain Teachers Differently? Evidence from Elementary Schools in Florida, EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y, 2013, at 14 (analyzing the net effect
of this flexibility).
105
See, e.g., 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1724-A (2016) (no tenure);
Jennifer Hom Chen, Note, California Charter School Teachers: Flexibility in the
Classroom, Vulnerability as an Employee, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1733, 1748 (2016);
Automatic Exemptions, supra note 103 (exempting from tenure); Brian Hicks,
Tough to Fire Teachers—Unless They Work at a Charter School, POST & COURIER,
(July 28, 2016), https://www.postandcourier.com/staff/brian_hicks/tough-tofire-teachers-unless-they-work-at-a-charter/article_4354d288-1678-53b5-ad02dd0ef64b80fc.html [https://perma.cc/2J95-NRXE].
103
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can take state resources and run with them as they see fit,
whereas public schools must operate within a set of strict
parameters.
First, as the figure below shows,106 53.4% of states exempt
charters from teacher certification laws. In some states, charters are free to hire anyone they deem qualified.107 In others,
charters can hire a certain percentage of uncertified teachers,
so long as the rest are certified.108 Other states simply set up
alternative certification requirements for charter teachers that
are less demanding than traditional public schools.109
FIGURE 3
PERCENTAGE OF STATES EXEMPTING CHARTERS FROM
STATE POLICY
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These exemptions have, over the past few years, played a
particularly special role in sparing charters from the teaching
crisis that has confronted public schools. In 2015, public
106
The calculations in this figure are generated from data in these sources
from the Education Commission of the States: Preston C. Green, III et al., An
Analysis of the Policy, Research, and Legal Issues Surrounding the Exclusion of
Charter Schools from the Teacher Evaluation Revolution, 43 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 467
(2014); Charter Schools - Do Teachers in a Charter School Have to be Certified?,
EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Jan. 2016), http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquest
NB2?rep=CS1525 [https://perma.cc/X9JJ-3PRB] [hereinafter Have to be Certified]; Charter Schools - What Sets Teacher Salaries?, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES
(Jan. 2016), http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2?rep=CS1526 [https://
perma.cc/DZC8-UT8Z]; Charter Schools - Are Charter Schools Bound by School
District Collective Bargaining Agreements?, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Jan.
2016), http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2?rep=CS1528 [https://
perma.cc/5QPU-E3LC] [hereinafter Collective Bargaining].
107
Have to be Certified, supra note 106.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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schools nationwide experienced the beginning of an extreme
shortage of minimally qualified and certified teachers.110 California schools, for instance, needed to hire 40% more certified
teachers than were actually in the market.111 The shortage
was only projected to get worse in the coming years.112
Shortages of this sort created intense competition for certified
teachers both within and between states.113 Less competitive
schools were forced to cancel classes, expand class sizes, seek
regulatory waivers, and place individuals in the classroom who
otherwise never would have been hired.114 Charters did not
confront this same problem because they, as they always had
been, were free to hire teachers regardless of their credentials.
Second, charters have far more flexibility regarding the salary and benefits they provide their teachers. Unlike traditional
public schools, four out of five states do not require charters to
collectively bargain with their teachers.115 Charters can nego110
Motoko Rich, Teacher Shortages Spur a Nationwide Hiring Scramble (Credentials Optional), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2015, at A1.
111
Id. (showing that the state issued 15,000 teaching credentials, which was
6,500 short of the open teaching positions); see MARJORIE A. SUCKOW & ROXANN L.
PURDUE, CAL. COMM’N ON TEACHER CREDENTIALING, TEACHER SUPPLY IN CALIFORNIA: A
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ANNUAL REPORT 2013–2014, at 16 (2015); Academic
Year 2014–15 Data, TITLE II HIGHER EDUCATION ACT, DATA TOOLS, https://title2.ed.
gov/Public/DataTools/Tables.aspx [https://perma.cc/UFX3-V8K7] (finding a
sharp drop in the number of students pursuing education degrees).
112
See SUCKOW & PURDUE, supra note 111, at 17 (showing substantial declines
in the number of individuals entering teacher preparation programs).
113
Missouri, for instance, raided Kansas of 4,000 teachers in 2015—a 70%
jump from prior years. AP, Teacher Shortages Spur Districts Nationwide to Try
New Tactics, (Aug. 12, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
teacher-shortages-spur-districts-nationwide-to-try-new-tactics/ [https://
perma.cc/4J96-YHAA]; Katie Ferrell, Kansas Teacher Shortage Expected to Get
Worse if Funding Issues Aren’t Resolved, FOX 4 NEWS KANSAS CITY (Aug. 3, 2015,
8:10 AM), http://fox4kc.com/2015/08/03/kansas-teacher-shortage-expectedto-get-worse-if-funding-issues-arent-resolved/ [https://perma.cc/5AQM-B6NX].
114
See, e.g., STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON TEACHER CREDENTIALING, DISTRICT INTERN
CREDENTIALS 3 (2015) (permitting interns to teach after 120 hours of training or six
credit hours of course work); Andrea Eger & Nour Habib, Crisis Hits Oklahoma
Classrooms with Teacher Shortage, Quality Concerns, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 16,
2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/education/crisis-hits-oklahoma-class
rooms-with-teacher-shortage-quality-concerns/article_54627559-bcc0-5ae5b654-9b7eec46ab3c.html [https://perma.cc/HV3F-YPPG]; Kristen A. Graham,
Looking for a Few Thousand Substitute Teachers, INQUIRER DAILY NEWS (Aug. 31,
2015), http://www.philly.com/philly/education/20150831_Looking_for_a_few_
thousand_substitute_teachers.html [https://perma.cc/89F4-5MPP]; Rebecca
Klein, Kansas Underfunded Education and Cut Tenure. Now It Can’t Find Enough
Teachers to Fill Classrooms, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2015, 8:01 AM), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kansas-teacher-shortage_us_55b913ebe4b0074
ba5a729d5 [https://perma.cc/F5YY-JA9E] (discussing using uncertified teachers and substitutes).
115
Collective Bargaining, supra note 106.
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tiate salaries and benefits as they choose—with teachers individually or as a group. Even when negotiating with groups, a
charter can typically negotiate salaries and benefits that are
lower than the prevailing wages in the area.116 Neither the
local collective bargaining agreement of the district nor teacher
salary laws apply.117 When teachers challenged these practices, the National Labor Relations Board found that while
charters were creations of state law, state law made charters
akin to private corporations that are not obligated to act as
public employers.118
This flexibility allows a charter or the private management
group that operates the charter to spend its resources on
things other than classroom instruction. Data in Ohio, for instance, indicates that the percentage of resources devoted to
teacher compensation is far lower in charter schools than
traditional public schools, whereas administrative overhead is
twice as high in charters.119 This administrative overhead, as
suggested by Kelley and Green’s work, translates into profits
for those managing the charter school or doing business with
it.120
Third, once charters secure their teaching force, they are
largely free to manage their teachers as a private employer
would. Most notable, charter teachers do not have access to
tenure protections. Teachers with a demonstrated record of
good performance acquire tenure in most states and cannot be
removed absent good cause,121 but charter school teachers do
not acquire tenure or due process protections in most
states.122 The only rights charter teachers have are those that
the charter school is willing to extend through contract. Thus,
charters often have the ability to dismiss teachers with or without good reason and with or without any process. As a practical matter, this means letting go of expensive teachers,
116

See, e.g., N.Y. Charter Ass’n v. Smith, 940 N.E.2d 522, 526 (N.Y. 2010).
Id.; see also Collective Bargaining, supra note 106.
118
Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. 455 (2012);
see also Rachel M. Cohen, The National Labor Relations Board Says Charter
School Teachers Are Private Employees, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 8, 2016), http://
prospect.org/article/national-labor-relations-board-says-charter-school-teach
ers-are-private-employees [https://perma.cc/ND6L-H8SE].
119
SHORT-CHANGED, supra note 36.
120
Kelley, III, supra note 19; Green, III, supra note 92.
121
See generally Black, supra note 22, at 103.
122
See, e.g., Chen, supra note 105, at 1737; see also Charter Schools - Does
the State Require School Districts to Grant Teachers a Leave of Absence to Teach in
a Charter School?, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Jan. 2016), http://ecs.force.com/
mbdata/mbquestNB2?rep=CS1527 [https://perma.cc/6DNC-RTLR].
117
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teachers who might express opinions that leadership does not
like, and teachers who might want better workplace conditions.
For that matter, charters in some states appear to have the
ability to even compel their teachers to do their political bidding123—something public schools absolutely cannot do.124
One of the rationales for exempting charters from tenure
and other requirements was to allow them to easily terminate
ineffective teachers.125 Ironically, however, states had another
solution to the ineffective teacher problem. Around 2009,
states began developing complex statistical teacher evaluations
systems to identify and remove ineffective public school teachers.126 Yet, half of the states did not extend those systems to
charter schools.127 Had states extended these evaluation systems to charters, there may have been little need for tenure and
other exemptions. In short, public schools took on vast new
responsibilities regarding teacher evaluation, while charters in
many states continued with business as usual.
4. Students
Charters do not operate under the same student enrollment and retention policies as traditional public schools. The
most important distinction may be the charters’ ability to cap
their enrollment number. A fundamental aspect of what makes
a traditional public school “public” is its duty to serve the community in which it is situated.128 Public schools—or the district—cannot turn away or fail to serve students for any reason.
Making the point clear, some states even obligate districts to
123
Zoë Carpenter, Were Charter Teachers and Students Pressured to Rally for
Charter Schools in Albany?, NATION (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/
article/were-charter-teachers-and-students-pressured-rally-charter-schools-al
bany/ [https://perma.cc/PX35-LGMX].
124
In fact, Texas law, for instance, prohibits school districts themselves from
promoting their desired policies with state resources. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 11.169 (prohibiting school districts from using funds or resources “to electioneer for or against any candidate, measure, or political party”); TEX. ELEC. CODE
ANN. § 255.003 (2017) (prohibiting public employees from devoting resources to
political advertising).
125
Chen, supra note 105, at 1737.
126
Through the Race to the Top Program and waivers under No Child Left
Behind, the U.S. Department of Education required states to change their laws
and evaluate teachers based on their students’ standardized exam scores and
make personnel decisions based on those evaluations. Black, supra note 22, at
92.
127
Green, III, supra note 106, at 470 (finding that teacher evaluation systems
applied to charters in 9 states, did not apply in 9 states, and were unclear as to
whether they applied in 3 states).
128
Derek W. Black, Charter Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 445, 477–79 (2013).
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serve students whom they have suspended or expelled.129 In
contrast, charters control their own enrollment, not the communities in which they locate themselves. A charter sets its
own enrollment cap in its state application and is under no
obligation to expand or make alternative arrangements for additional students, not even for needy students who live next
door to the charter.130
Second, charters have far more leeway to exclude students
once they are enrolled. Charters may adopt curriculum and
codes of conduct that are far more rigorous than the traditional
public schools and then exclude students who cannot meet
these expectations (or encourage students to voluntarily
leave).131 For instance, some charters have discipline policies
that assign students demerits for behavior as minor as not
walking in a straight line or not looking up when an adult is
speaking.132 The accumulation of too many demerits leads to
expulsion.133 A high court in California went so far as to say
that because charters are schools of choice, they need not even
afford students due process hearings prior to exclusion.134
Traditional public schools have latitude in school discipline as well, but not that much. Most obviously, the policies
would be subject to public approval, which would hopefully
reign in abusive policies. Even if not, the Constitution would
likely limit certain disciplinary policies.135 At the very least,
public schools must afford students due process prior to sus129
Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1985)
(noting that the obligation to provide education came from statutes); King v.
Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259, 260 (N.C. 2010); State ex rel. G.S.,
749 A.2d 902, 907 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
130
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-402 (2007); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 17-1723-A
(2017) (affording district discretion in enrollment numbers but prohibiting local
board from capping charter enrollment); see also Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Dep’t of
Educ., 92 A.3d 746, 747 (Pa. 2014) (adjudicating a dispute regarding charter
enrollment cap).
131
Kerrin Wolf et al., Charting School Discipline, 48 URB. L. 1, 3 (2016).
132
Id.; Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Chicago’s Noble Charter School Network Has
Tough Discipline Policy, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune
.com/2014-04-07/news/ct-charter-noble-discipline-met-20140407_1_noblestudents-charter-chicago-public-schools [https://perma.cc/2RA3-KWLR].
133
Wolf, supra note 131, at 28; Kari Harden, Civil Rights Complaints Are Filed
Against Three N.O. Schools, LA. WKLY. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.louisianaweek
ly.com/civil-rights-complaints-are-filed-against-three-n-o-schools/ [https://
perma.cc/4BGX-73AK] (discussing a civil rights complaint against a charter
school with a 68% suspension rate).
134
Scott B. v. Bd. of Trs. of Orange Cty. High Sch. of Arts, 158 Cal Rptr. 3d
173, 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
135
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99
MINN. L. REV. 823, 841 (2015).
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pension or expulsion.136 In short, public schools have the
power to exclude students, but that power exists within a distinct set of legal parameters. Whereas charters have substantial latitude that, in effect, permits them to serve the students
they wish to serve, not all of the students who may wish to
come.
Third, charters also have the ability to shape the pool of
students who seek enrollment. Charters advertise and promote their school to prospective applicants. Marketing is so
key to the business of starting and growing a charter school
that the industry puts together marketing guidebooks.137 The
manner in which a charter markets itself, however, allows it to
encourage some prospective applicants to apply and remain
unknown to others.138 Likewise, through their curricular focus, transportation policies, receptivity to student needs, and
capacity to serve students with special needs, charters can
discourage and encourage certain demographic groups.139
This is not to suggest that charters officially discriminate
against special education students, but that some families do
not bother applying because they do not believe the charter can
or will meet their child’s needs.140 Those same parents, however, know that a public school is required to serve the entire
community and the needs of all the students in it (even if the
school is ineffective in discharging that duty).141 Parents need
not apply to public schools; their children are guaranteed to
attend.
Data bears out the effect of these subtle practices. Traditional public schools typically enroll a higher percentage of
special education and English Language Learners (ELL) stu136

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975).
Lisa Relou Consulting & Colo. League of Charter Sch., Stand Out: A Guide
to School Marketing, CHARTER SCH. CTR. https://www.charterschoolcenter.org/
sites/default/files/files/field_publication_attachment/StandOut-MarketingTookit-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAU7-9KQM] (last visited July 28, 2017).
138
See generally Kara Finley, Advertising and Charter School Families, (2015)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Southern Utah University, https://www.suu.edu/hss/
comm/masters/capstone/project/k-finley.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS5V-DVX8]).
139
See, e.g., Garda, supra note 61, at 686 (revealing how charters “counsel
out” special education students); PAUL T. O’NEILL & TODD ZIEBARTH, CHARTER
SCHOOL LAW DESKBOOK 4–5, 7 (2009) (noting charters’ specialized curricula).
140
Garda, supra note 61, at 685.
141
LAUREN M. RHIM & MARGARET J. MCLAUGHLIN, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND SPECIAL
EDUCATION: BALANCING DISPARATE VISIONS: AN INVESTIGATION OF CHARTER SCHOOLS AND
SPECIAL EDUCATION IN FIFTEEN STATES 25 (2000) (“Parents look at the charters and
see that the district offers their severely disabled child more services.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
137
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dents than charter schools.142 In Newark, for instance, seven
charter schools sent applications to the Department of Education.143 Those applications revealed that not a single charter
school enrolled a special education population comparable to
the public schools.144 Five out of seven enrolled less than half
the percent as public schools.145 The comparison was even
worse in regard to ELLs. ELLs make up 9% of Newark public
schools but were 1% or less of the population in six out of seven
charters.146 Reports reveal that this phenomenon is not
unique to Newark.
B. Vouchers
1. Funding
While state support for vouchers has traditionally been
limited,147 it has grown substantially in the last few years.
Florida was at the leading edge of the expansion, developing
what some refer to as “neo-vouchers.”148 Rather than the
traditional voucher that sent public funds directly to private
schools, these neo-vouchers funnel the money through a complex process of tax credits,149 which is discussed further below.
For the most part, however, this Article refers to vouchers and
neo-vouchers collectively as vouchers because the main point
is to analyze the movement of public resources to private education, not the particular method.
In the 2008–09 school year, Florida spent over $88 million
on its voucher program.150 By the 2013–14 school year, the
state’s spending on the program had more than tripled.151 In142
See, e.g., WEBER & RUBIN, supra note 61, at 18; Garda, supra note 61, at
711; FAMILIES FOR EXCELLENT SCH., THE NEGLECT OF NYC’S ENGLISH LANGUAGE
LEARNER AND SPECIAL NEEDS STUDENTS 3, http://39sf0512acpc3iz0941zlzn
5.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Report-Neglect-ofNYCs-ELLSpecial-Needs-Students.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SDP-R54K].
143
Brief on Behalf of Appellant Education Law Center, In re Renewal Application of TEAM Acad. Charter Sch., No. A-003416-15T1, at 5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Feb. 14, 2017).
144
Id., at 7.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 7–8.
147
See generally Forman, supra note 6, at 549.
148
KEVIN G. WELNER, NEOVOUCHERS: THE EMERGENCE OF TUITION TAX CREDITS FOR
PRIVATE SCHOOLING (2008).
149
Id.; see also Levin, supra note 10, at 1067.
150
FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., CORPORATE TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM: JUNE
QUARTERLY REPORT 2 (2009), https://www.stepupforstudents.org/wp-content/up
loads/2015/09/ctc-stats-09-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW8W-875E] [hereinafter CTC SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 2009].
151
See FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FLORIDA TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM: JUNE
2014 QUARTERLY REPORT 2 (2014), http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/
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diana followed Florida’s lead and enacted the most expansive
voucher program in our nation’s history in 2011.152 Within
three years, student enrollment in Indiana’s voucher program
grew by roughly 600% and state expenditures on it by nearly
500%.153 After these programs survived constitutional challenge,154 similar programs began expanding in other states as
well.155
While the growth alone is compelling, the context in which
it occurred makes it all the clearer that states were creating a
preference for private choice. The expanded investment in new
voucher programs came at the very same time that states were
making huge cuts in public education. Between 2008 and
2012, for instance, Florida cut its public school per-pupil expenditures from $10,129 per pupil to $7,777 per pupil. 156 Not
only was Florida making more vouchers available, it was, as
the chart below reveals, also increasing the value of those
vouchers each year. The money the state spent on vouchers
could have been used to offset cuts to public education, but the
state chose not to, making its preference for private choice
clear. Other states were even more explicit, taking those
voucher increases directly out of local school district
budgets.157

7558/urlt/ftc_report_june2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CBV-D9HQ] [hereinafter
FTC SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 2014].
152
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Mike Pence’s Claim that Indiana Has the Largest
School Voucher Program, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/08/12/mike-pences-claim-thatindiana-has-the-largest-school-voucher-program/ [https://perma.cc/NCS53F2P].
153
IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT: PARTICIPATION AND PAYMENT DATA 6, 22 (2015).
154
Ye Hee Lee, supra note 152.
155
See Voucher Watch, EDUC. L. CTR. (Dec. 2017), http://www.edlawcenter.
org/assets/files/pdfs/Charters%20and%20Vouchers/Voucher_Watch_Chart_up
dated_Dece.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS3H-TUAA].
156
BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 8
(4th ed. 2015).
157
See TAMARINE CORNELIUS & JON PEACOCK, WIS. BUDGET PROJECT, AN OVERVIEW
OF EDUCATION ISSUES IN THE 2013–15 BUDGET (2013).
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FIGURE 4
FLORIDA PER-PUPIL EXPENDITURES
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Figure 4. Florida per-pupil expenditure. Source: BRUCE D. BAKER, DAVID G.
SCIARRA, DANIELLE FARRIE, IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD, 32 (7th
ed., 2018); BRUCE D. BAKER, DAVID G. SCIARRA, DANIELLE FARRIE, IS SCHOOL FUNDING
FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 5 (4th ed., 2015); FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
FLORIDA TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2017), available at http://
www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/15230/urlt/FTC_Sept_2017_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E98T-P4GZ].

States increasingly accomplished this expanded funding
through a complicated system that allows private individuals
and companies to donate to private scholarship programs in
exchange for tax credits.158 The internal workings of that system further represent the private-choice preference. First,
those who donate to the program, in some instances, get back
more than they contributed. Under state law, donors can offset
their state tax liability by 70 to 100 cents for every dollar
donated.159 Additionally, these donors can claim a federal tax
exemption on the same donation.160 In other words, some
states created systems in which private parties can actually
profit off of donating to the state’s tax scholarship program.
The states’ motivation for the circuitous route itself was to
avoid other legal barriers involved in funding traditional vouchers,161 but states’ willingness to overfund donors for the cost of
158

See WELNER, supra note 148.
Anya Kamenetz, ‘Tax Credit Scholarships,’ Praised by Trump, Turn Profits
for Some Donors, NPR (Mar. 7, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/
2017/03/07/518352548/trump-s-favorite-school-choice-program-allowswealthy-donors-to-turn-a-profit [https://perma.cc/7GW7-SDET].
160
Id.
161
See id. For an example of legal barriers to funding vouchers, see Bush v.
Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).
159
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voucher donations reveals an extreme preference for private
choice, particularly when no equivalent tax credit program was
available for donations to public schools. In short, states went
above and beyond during a time of financial crisis to fund
private choice but did little if anything for public education.
This preference only becomes all the more unusual when
one considers how program eligibility has changed over time.
In prior decades, vouchers were reserved for disadvantaged
students hoping to escape failing schools.162 With that purpose in mind, the programs always remained limited in scale
and the reimbursement amounts small. The recent increase in
enrollment and voucher amounts, however, has coincided with
abandoning that mission and its limits. New programs raise or
entirely eliminate those income eligibility caps, making vouchers available to the middle and upper class as well.163 At the
same time, states vastly increased the number of vouchers they
were willing to fund. Together, these changes opened the floodgates of raw expansion. In the years represented below, Florida’s total expenditures on vouchers increased by 482% and
Indiana’s by 900%.

162
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002) (describing
a program in which aid was distributed according to financial need); Jackson v.
Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 617 (Wis. 1998) (describing a program in which eligibility was based in part on income); see also Forman, supra note 6, at 573 (describing the voucher movement as “teaching the urban poor to read, write, and see a
future”).
163
See Derek Black, Voucher Movement Finally Coming Clean? New Push Is
All About Middle Income Students, EDUC. L. PROF. BLOG (July 31, 2015), http://law
professors.typepad.com/education_law/2015/07/voucher-movement-finallycoming-clean-new-push-is-all-about-middle-income-students.html [https://
perma.cc/8ZHQ-WYAL]; Patti Zarling, 10 Things to Know About Private School
Vouchers, GREEN BAY PRESS GAZETTE, http://www.greenbaypressgazette.com/
story/news/education/2015/08/01/things-know-private-school-vouchers/
30983793/ [https://perma.cc/L5UK-RT6P] (last visited Apr. 14, 2018).
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FIGURE 5
TOTAL VOUCHERS EXPENDITURES BY YEAR164
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In the last three years, other states have developed or proposed voucher programs that could make Florida and Indiana’s
programs appear modest by comparison. As large as the expansion in Florida and Indiana has been, the states still fund
vouchers at a lower per-pupil level than public education and
limit the number of vouchers they will fund per year (albeit at a
high level). New programs in Arizona and Nevada have sought
to eliminate both of these constraints.
In 2016, Arizona nearly passed a voucher program that
would have funded a voucher for every student in the state,
regardless of income level or the performance of their local
public school.165 The voucher amount for regular education
students was also set at 90% of state per-pupil expenditures in
public schools and 100% for students from low-income families
or students who have been in foster care.166 The state eventually agreed to limit the number of vouchers it would fund but
retained the high reimbursement rates.167
164
Indiana calculations were based on I ND. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHOICE
SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT: PARTICIPATION AND PAYMENT DATA (Jan. 27,
2014) and IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT:
PARTICIPATION AND PAYMENT DATA (Feb. 2017). Florida calculations were based on:
FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., CORPORATE TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM (2010), FLA. DEP’T
OF EDUC., supra note 150, FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FLORIDA TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP
PROGRAM (2011), and FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FLORIDA TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
(2016).
165
S.B. 1279, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016), http://www.azleg.gov/
legtext/52leg/2r/bills/sb1279s.pdf [https://perma.cc/VYE3-3XHC].
166
See Wingett & O’Dell, supra note 4.
167
See Yvonne Wingett Sanchez et al., Gov. Doug Ducey Signs Expansion of
Arizona’s School-Voucher Program, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Apr. 7, 2017, 12:07 AM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona-education/2017/04/
07/arizona-gov-doug-ducey-signs-school-voucher-expansion/100159192/
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In 2015, Nevada broke both barriers. It authorized vouchers at 90% to 100% of the statewide average per-pupil funding
for public schools and included no limit on the number of students who could participate.168 In other words, it authorized
the diversion of nearly every cent of state public-education
funding to vouchers.169
2. Students
In addition to these funding preferences, states have advantaged private voucher schools in terms of the students they
enroll and the rights they afford them. In general, these
voucher preferences fall under the category of offering public
money with no strings attached. Public schools, of course, are
subject to a number of constitutional and statutory limitations,
most notably those pertaining to nondiscrimination and general student rights. Private schools, because they are not state
actors, are not subject to those constitutional limitations, nor
are they generally subject to education statutes.170 That freedom is fair enough when private schools are not using public
money, but far more questionable when they are.
States have, at best, ignored the issue and, at worst, have
sought to exploit the freedom of private schools. States have
funneled enormous sums of money and students to private
schools through vouchers without asking that those schools
ensure the funds are spent consistent with prevailing public
values.171 The private schools remain free to discriminate
against students in the enrollment process (particularly in regard to religion), restrict student speech, punish students
harshly, deny students basic due process, and refuse to provide special education services.172 Some legislators would ar[https://perma.cc/B5FN-CLES]. The bill originally would have authorized funding for an unlimited number of participants but was later scaled back. See id.
168
See Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886, 892 (Nev. 2016).
169
After the Nevada Supreme Court declared the program unconstitutional
because it drew its resources directly out of the state’s common school fund, the
Governor still moved to reinstate the program and simply relied on a different
funding source. See Big Setback for Vouchers in Nevada, EDUC. L. CTR. (June 5,
2017), http://www.edlawcenter.org/news/archives/nevada/big-setback-forvouchers-in-nevada.html [https://perma.cc/4F5N-9SAZ].
170
See Johnson v. Pinkerton Acad., 861 F.2d 335, 337 (1st Cir. 1988); Countryman, supra note 21, at 530.
171
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS (2009) (detailing the minimal requirements for accreditation, licensing, and approval in
many states); See also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 20
(listing the minimal requirements that some states do place on private voucher
schools).
172
Countryman, supra note 21, at 530.
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gue that these exemptions are the very point of funding
vouchers. They, for instance, want to free the state of the cost
and legal demands of educating students with disabilities. Encouraging private schools to take these students without any
strings attached achieves this end.173 Similarly, many voucher
proponents want to provide students with religious experiences
that are prohibited in public schools.174
Whatever the merits of these motivations, the exemptions
represent a substantial preference for private choice in education. Public schools must take all students, whereas private
schools can choose their students, including on grounds that
would be illegal in public schools. Likewise, when a student’s
performance, attitude, or beliefs become undesirable, a private
school can exclude the student.
This discretion, in its various forms, allows private schools
to create homogenous enclaves that are inapposite to public
education. While that right might be appropriate in a purely
private setting, the government need not facilitate these inapposite values when those schools are no longer fully private.
When those schools enroll public school students and rely on
public money, the failure of a state to check private biases
amounts to tacit acceptance. For that reason, the federal government has traditionally taken a stance entirely contrary to
the one states are taking. Federal statutes make any private
school receiving federal funds subject to a host of race, sex, and
disability discrimination statutes, among others.175
C. Shrinking Education Pot
The funds available for public education on the whole have
shrunk dramatically over the past decade.176 Available data
suggests that the decline correlates with the expansion of
choice and that the overall pot of public education funding,
even if charters were included, is shrinking. In other words,
states’ choice policies are not simply robbing Peter to pay Paul.
They are robbing Peter under the auspices of giving it all to
173
Claire S. Raj, Coerced Choice: School Vouchers and Students with Disabilities, 68 EMORY L. J. (forthcoming 2018).
174
See Katherine Stewart, Betsy DeVos and God’s Plan for Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/opinion/betsy-devosand-gods-plan-for-schools.html [https://perma.cc/J3UD-3YE6].
175
See § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §701 (2012); Cannon
v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 677 (1979); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2012).
176
See MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MOST
STATES HAVE CUT SCHOOL FUNDING, AND SOME CONTINUE CUTTING 1 (2016).
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Paul but actually shaving a chunk off of public education funding and leaving Peter and Paul to fight one another. The push
for choice makes the ruse possible.
Ten and twenty percent reductions in public education
funding were commonplace during the recession.177 The recession, however, does not explain the extent to which those cuts
have remained. As of 2015, thirty-one states were still funding
public education below pre-recession levels.178 During the
same period, voucher and charter programs grew rapidly. That
growth remains today, even in states that already have substantial choice programs and remain well below their pre-recession funding levels.
In 2014, Arizona, Florida, and New Jersey, for instance,
were still 23%, 7.8%, and 7.5% below pre-recession spending
respectively. Yet, in 2014–15, they were projected to experience growth rates in charter enrollment at or above 20%.179 In
addition, Arizona and Florida have laid the ground for and are
experiencing even greater growth in their voucher programs.180
The irony here, however, is that no matter who gets the
money—charter schools, public schools, or vouchers—the
overall pot was shrinking. This trend attests to the possibility
that some policymakers do not simply prefer private choice—
they lack a commitment to public education.
D. Taking Choice to the Next Level
Events over the past year suggest that the preference for
private choice could become more deep-seated and widespread.
Thus far, the preference has expanded on a state-by-state basis and to varying degrees. The federal government, however, is
seeking to play a leadership role and spur further expansion.
The President has repeatedly pledged his full support to expanding school choice. Most prominently, the President decried public schools as delivering “inferior education” in a 2017
speech to Congress, declaring his “school-choice bill” as the
177

See id.
See id.
179
NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PUBLIC CHARTER
SCHOOLS & STUDENTS, 2014-2015, at 2–3 (2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/open_closed_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6C3N-ZNQR].
180
See Wingett & O’Dell, supra note 4; Leslie Postal, House Panel Votes to
Expand School Vouchers, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 7, 2017), http://
www.orlandosentinel.com/features/education/school-zone/os-school-vouchersflorida-house-disabled-students-20170307-story.html [https://perma.cc/U43XN3PJ].
178
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solution to the “the civil rights issue of our time.”181 The President appointed Betsy DeVos as Secretary of Education to carry
out the agenda. She has been even more direct, arguing that
parents have the “right” to school choice182 and those opposing
the right are “flat-earthers.”183
In May 2017, the administration proposed a federal budget
that would achieve the “most ambitious expansion of education
choice in our nation’s history.”184 The new budget would add
$1 billion to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act—the primary mechanism for providing supplemental resources to low-income students.185 To access the money, however, states and districts would have to adopt student
enrollment policies that allow families to choose their own
schools and take public money with them.186 Partial state supplements for school choice would be insufficient. The budget
would require that all local, state, and federal dollars follow the
child, regardless of the school the student attends.187 In other
words, the budget would nationalize the most aggressive type
of school choice preference—one that would allow every penny
of public education funding to flow into choice.
Whether this budget proposal gains traction this year or
next remains to be seen, but the forceful stance may have
emboldened states to act in advance. An expansive voucher bill
closely aligned with the President’s agenda received the ap181
Louis Freedberg, Trump Frames ‘School Choice’ Agenda as Civil Rights
Initiative, EDSOURCE (Mar. 8, 2017), https://edsource.org/2017/trump-framesschool-choice-agenda-as-civil-rights-initiative/578092 [https://perma.cc/7ZGCX88R].
182
Trump Education Pick DeVos Promotes School Choice at Confirmation Hearing, FOX NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/17/
trump-education-pick-devos-to-push-school-choice-at-confirmation-hearing.
html [https://perma.cc/X8RP-Q52X]; see also Greg Toppo & Todd Spangler,
DeVos Grilled by Democratic Leaders over Her Advocacy for School Choice, USA
TODAY (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/01/17/
devos-outlines-vision-us-department-education/96689510/ [ https://perma.cc/
GQ93-MWYJ] (speaking of private school options as what parents “want, expect
and deserve” because “[n]ot all [public] schools are working for the students that
are assigned to them”).
183
Kate Abbey-Lambertz, Betsy DeVos Compares School Choice Critics to “FlatEarthers,” HUFFINGTON POST (May 23, 2017, 6:59 PM), https://www.huffington
post.com/entry/betsy-devos-school-choice-flat-earthers_us_5924a9b7e4b0ec
129d30556f [https://perma.cc/K79L-L2GV].
184
Id.
185
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION, FISCAL YEAR 2018 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 7 (2018).
186
See id. at 2.
187
See id.
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proval of the Texas senate and governor.188 When it later failed
in the House, the Senate refused to pass a public education
budget unless the House agreed to at least a scaled-back version of the school choice bill.189 While choice expansion does
not come as a complete surprise in Texas, school choice bills
also moved forward in several other less obvious states.190 By
June 2017, new voucher bills had been proposed in twentyfour states.191
The major voucher programs already in place combined
with the potential of these new ones threaten a new era in
education choice and the expenditure of public education
funds. As Michael Heise’s empirical analysis of charter and
voucher legislation prior to 2012 revealed, charter school legislation had vastly expanded, in part, as a “defensive political
move to deflect school voucher progress or a political compromise.”192 The recent vast expansion of voucher programs in
states that already have a robust charter school program, however, may suggest that the solidification of charters has expanded states’ appetite for choice in all forms. In other words,
while charters may have stalled voucher expansion in the past,
they help fuel it now. As the President’s proposal makes clear,
the new movement does not pit charters against vouchers in a
fight over meager crumbs; it seeks to make all public expenditures on education fungible as amongst traditional public
schools, charters, and vouchers. This occurrence at the state
or federal level would represent a fundamentally new era in the
structure of educational opportunity.

188
See Robert T. Garrett, Complex Texas Voucher Bill Would Shift Funds to
Families, but Costs to State, Schools Unclear, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas-legislature/2017/02/08/complextexas-voucher-bill-shift-funds-families-costs-state-schools-unclear [https://
perma.cc/9WVQ-4NS7].
189
See Aliyya Swaby, Senate Panel Tacks “School Choice” Provision onto Education Finance Bill, TEX. TRIB. (May 11, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/
2017/05/11/senate-education-committee-hears-school-finance/ [https://
perma.cc/DSD8-C23R].
190
See Brian Washington, 5 States to Watch Regarding Private School Voucher
Threats, EDUC. VOTES (Jan. 27, 2017), http://educationvotes.nea.org/2017/01/
27/5-states-watch-regarding-private-school-voucher-threats/ [https://
perma.cc/G29F-HG6N] (discussing voucher bills in Nevada, Virginia, Nebraska,
Iowa, Missouri, and New Hampshire).
191
Voucher Watch, supra note 155.
192
Michael Heise, Law and Policy Entrepreneurs: Empirical Evidence on the
Expansion of School Choice Policy, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1917 (2012).
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II
UNDERMINING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
While states’ preference for choice communicates an important message, the actual effect of state policy on public
education opportunities matters just as much, if not more. A
state might, after all, preference choice but serve families who
forego the choice options that a state presents. Under these
circumstances, a state’s preference might have minimal effects
on public education. On the other hand, a state that offers
families a choice may intend to maintain its commitments to
public education, but its policies inadvertently or carelessly
undermine public education. Because state constitutions generally impose an absolute duty on states to deliver certain types
of educational opportunities, these effects are crucial.
Yet, prior scholarship has tended to miss the most important effects by focusing on the macro level. At the macro level,
claims that choice is undermining public education often appear alarmist. For the first decade of charter legislation, charter schools enrolled less than 1% of the nation’s students.193
While charters have grown exponentially, the number of students in charters today remains small at 5% nationally.194
Even states with the largest charter populations, public
schools’ statewide market share remains dominant. Only three
states have charter populations in excess of 10%.195 Voucher
enrollments are far more meager.
At the micro level, however, the effects of choice can be
staggering. Statewide education choice policies do not affect all
districts equally. Their effects are heavily concentrated on a
select group of districts. These districts can have choice programs that enroll a third of a district’s students—and those
percentages continue to grow. As the following sections
demonstrate, that growth is causing opportunity deficits in
public schools, threatening the very financial viability of some
districts, and stratifying educational opportunity across and
within education sectors.
193
See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., NUMBER AND ENROLLMENT OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, BY SCHOOL LEVEL, TYPE, AND CHARTER AND MAGNET
STATUS: SELECTED YEARS, 1990–91 THROUGH 2014–15, https://nces.ed.gov/pro

grams/digest/d16/tables/dt16_216.20.asp [https://perma.cc/GQF2-ZG7C]
(last visited Mar. 23, 2018).
194
See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., FAST FACTS: CHARTER SCHOOLS, https://
nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=30 [https://perma.cc/TTM9-Z5QD] (last
visited Mar. 23, 2018).
195
Id.
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A. Concentrating the Effects of Choice and the Shrinking
Education Pot
When viewed at the statewide level, funding and choice
trends may appear manageable, but at the district level, they
are rapidly transforming public school districts and fundamentally compromising their ability to deliver quality and consistent educational opportunities. In Ohio, Columbus and
Cleveland provide harsh examples. Between 2004 and 2013,
the percentage of students enrolled in charter schools in Columbus rose from less than 10% to 30%.196 The trajectory in
Cleveland was nearly identical.197 Midway through that era,
statewide funding for public education took a serious dip. 198
While it has since rebounded some in 2014, it remained 2.2%
below 2008 levels.199
A closer look at Cleveland and Columbus, however, reveals
that those districts are bleeding money to charter schools and
the state is doing little to address the problem. The state, for
instance, recently announced a $464 million statewide increase for public education.200 That increase, however, was
swallowed by the $760 million in transfers the state would
require districts to make to charters.201 The deficit, of course,
was most pronounced in places where charters are concentrated. Cleveland saw a $5 million increase in state funding
but would have to transfer $141 million to local charters.202
Columbus saw a $40 million increase from the state but would
transfer $116 million to charters.203
As the education pot shrinks, the delivery of public education becomes all the more tenuous in those districts also experiencing the concentrated effects of choice expansion. The more
traditional public education suffers, the more the overall statutory structure incentivizes exits from the public education system. A vicious cycle of this sort threatens a situation in which
choice programs are the only ones capable of thriving. Whether
any particular district has reached or is about to reach a point
196
See BRUCE D. BAKER, ECON. POL’Y INST., EXPLORING THE CONSEQUENCES OF
CHARTER SCHOOL EXPANSION IN U.S. CITIES 17 fig.3 (2016), https://www.epi.org/
files/pdf/109218.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AHS-GCKB].
197
See id.
198
See LEACHMAN ET AL., supra note 176, at 2.
199
LEACHMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 4 fig.2.
200
INNOVATION OHIO, BUDGET BRIEFING: DISTRICT-BY-DISTRICT FUNDING IMPACTS OF
OHIO CHARTER SCHOOLS (2015), http://innovationohio.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/02/IO_IssuesReview_CharterImpact.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7YM-7GFZ].
201
See id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
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of no return is beyond the scope of this Article, but serious
harms are regularly occurring in major cities.
Newark, New Jersey, provides an excellent case study.
There, dwindling state revenues and charter school policies
appear to have directly undermined the district’s ability to fund
adequate education opportunities. In 2010, the state announced massive cuts to its education funding formula, reducing the statewide budget by nearly $1.1 billion (15%) from the
previous year.204 This represented a $1.6 billion shortfall in
terms of the state’s own calculations of the funding necessary
to provide adequate educational opportunities.205 Funding
transfers to charters only made matters worse in Newark.
In Newark, the percentage of students attending charters
tripled between 2008 and 2014, rising from 9% to 28%. 206 The
technical oddities in the way the state calculates the dollar
amount districts must transfer to charters resulted in Newark
going further in the hole with each transfer. Depending on the
year, the state formula required Newark to send charters
$1,000 to $2,000 more per transfer than the district would
have received had the student remained in Newark public
schools.207 In other words, the district was suffering a net loss
over and above the base loss with each transfer.
Between 2008 and 2014, public school funding in the district fell by $2,971 per pupil—a 20% cut. 208 A loss of this
amount is strong evidence that Newark may no longer have
been providing adequate education opportunities in its public
schools (assuming that it was prior to the cuts). State cuts
alone brought Newark well below what the state itself had
pegged as the funds necessary for adequate education. The
required transfers to charters only created a bigger deficit.
Newark’s unique struggles are further evidenced by statewide
comparison. In 2008–09, Newark was in the top 35% of districts in terms of per-pupil spending, but by 2014, had fallen to
the bottom 13%.209 Newark only avoided falling further by taking on a larger local tax burden.210
204

See Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1025–26 (N.J. 2011).
See id.
206
See BAKER, supra note 196, at 29 fig.20 (providing 2008 data); NAT’L ALL.
FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., A GROWING MOVEMENT: AMERICA’S LARGEST CHARTER SCHOOL
COMMUNITIES app. A at 13 (10th ed. 2015) [hereinafter A GROWING MOVEMENT 2015],
http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/enrollmentshare_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/989C-DY49].
207
See FARRIE & JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 6–7.
208
Id. at 1.
209
See id. at 2.
210
See BAKER, supra note 196, at 40 fig.34.
205
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Newark is not alone. Statewide cuts along with charter
transfers had similar effects in Ohio. In Columbus, for instance, the district’s per-pupil expenditures fell from $9,399 in
2007 to $7,905 in 2013, a 15% cut.211 Florida, however, offers
an even more complex and troubling story, as charters and
vouchers were both exerting heavy influences in places like
Broward County. Between 2008 and 2014, the Broward
County’s charter population doubled, rising to 16% of the student enrollment in the district.212 The voucher population,
while much smaller, quintupled.213 Making matters worse, the
state was increasing the funding per voucher, which resulted
in a 589% increase in total voucher spending in the county.214
As the chart below demonstrates, these rapid voucher and
charter increases coincided with substantial drops in public
school per-pupil spending in Broward. Thus, not only was the
district losing the money associated with departing charter and
voucher students, per-pupil spending for the students who remained behind was also shrinking. Between the 2007–08 and
2011–12 school years, for instance, Broward per-pupil spending in the district’s general education program fell from $6,462
to $5,600, and its spending on exceptional students fell from
$12,020 to $10,263.215 As troubling as these trajectories are,
Florida passed legislation in 2017 that makes new additional
exponential growth in the charter sector possible, risking further downward trends in per-pupil expenditures in Broward.216

211

Id. at 45 fig.39.
See A GROWING MOVEMENT 2015, supra note 206, at 7–8.
213
See infra note 215.
214
Calculations based on data in sources infra note 217.
215
See FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FINANCIAL PROFILES OF FLORIDA SCHOOL DISTRICTS:
2007–2008 FINANCIAL DATA STATISTICAL REPORT 23 (2009), http://www.fldoe.org/
core/fileparse.php/7507/urlt/0077125-07-08profiles.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NQ94-MFPH]; FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FINANCIAL PROFILES OF FLORIDA SCHOOL DISTRICTS
2011–2012 FINANCIAL DATA STATISTICAL REPORT 23 (2013), http://www.fldoe.org/
core/fileparse.php/7507/urlt/0077109-11-12profiles.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2AVM-BLBS].
216
See Gary Fineout, Florida Gov. Signs Bill to Shift Students, Money to Charters, U.S. NEWS (June 15, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/
florida/articles/2017-06-15/florida-gov-to-sign-bill-that-shifts-students-tocharters [https://perma.cc/HA63-38BR].
212
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FIGURE 6
BROWARD COUNTY INCREASES IN RELATION TO
2007 BASELINE217
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Recent social science findings suggest that the cuts Newark, Columbus, and Broward experienced likely produced serious academic consequences. Examining decades of school
funding and achievement data, Kirabo Jackson found that a
20% increase in per-pupil funding, if maintained over time,
produces academic gains that are equivalent to a full additional
year’s worth of learning.218 That additional learning eliminates
two-thirds of the gap in outcomes between low- and middleincome students.219 Another study found that a 10% increase
in school funding correlates with a 5% increase in graduation
rates.220 That students in Newark, Columbus, and Broward
escaped these harms is unlikely. Reports clearly indicate, for
instance, that Newark was forced to cut regular instruction,
social work and guidance services, and teaching and support
staff221—all of which have impacts on student outcomes.
217
Derived from CTC SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 2009 and FTC SCHOLARSHIP
PROGRAM 2014, supra notes 150–151; STEVEN D. HONEGGER, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATS., REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL
DISTRICTS: SCHOOL YEAR 2007–08 at 10 tbl.7 (2010) [hereinafter REVENUES &
EXPENDITURES 2007–08], https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010323.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6E7A-JUC9]; STEPHEN Q. CORNMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS.,
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL
DISTRICTS: SCHOOL YEAR 2011–12 app. D tbl.D-4 at D-5 (2015) [hereinafter
REVENUES & EXPENDITURES 2011–12], https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014
303.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG5R-F8TD].
218
See Jackson et al., supra note 17, at 190–91.
219
See id.
220
Candelaria & Shores, supra note 17, at 24.
221
See Farrie & Johnson, supra note 15, at 1–2.
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B. Stratification of Educational Benefits and Burdens
The changes in education funding and student market
share between the various sectors are also producing further
stratification in educational opportunity—financially, qualitatively, and demographically. First, because charters schools
and voucher enrollment are not proportionally spread across
states, they have primarily become the price students living in
poor neighborhoods with poor public schools are asked to pay.
These students, however, already have the highest needs and
typically the most underfunded schools in the state. Thus, the
concentrated negative effects of charters are often visited on
state’s most needy students.
Consider Broward County. Almost half of the district’s students are low-income, 70% are minority, and 9% are ELLs.222
It is this type of district that so often disproportionately bears
the negative financial impacts and inadequacies noted above.
While Broward County only has 10% of the state’s public
school population,223 it has 16% of the state’s charter school
population.224 When places like Broward, Newark, and Columbus experience disproportional choice growth and negative financial consequences, the gap between these high-need
districts and others in the state only expands.
But even within these individual districts, stratification
can occur both in terms of benefits and burdens. As Julia
Burdick-Will’s study of Chicago found, “it was actually children
in affluent neighborhoods who stayed close to home for school.
In lower-income neighborhoods, kids in search of better options dispersed to dozens of other schools, often commuting
alone for miles.”225 “[W]hen the neighborhood income dropped
to less than $25,000, students dispersed to an average of 13
different schools,” with much longer average commute times
than their peers.226 The right to choose a school is not a privi222
See BROAD FOUND., BROWARD COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS: DISTRICT PROFILE
(2008), http://broadfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/1177tbp2008browardfactsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BBZ-PBG7].
223
FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., PK-12 PUBLIC SCHOOL DATA PUBLICATIONS AND REPORTS
(2017), http://www.fldoe.org/accountability/data-sys/edu-info-accountabilityservices/pk-12-public-school-data-pubs-reports/students.stml [https://
perma.cc/9DPV-GFFC].
224
FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FLORIDA CHARTER SCHOOL LIST BY DISTRICT (2017), http:/
/www.floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/charter_schools/Directory/ [https://
perma.cc/NF3C-BV9P].
225
News Release, Jill Rosen, Johns Hopkins Univ., Neighbors But Not Classmates (Sept. 2, 2015), http://releases.jhu.edu/2015/09/02/neighbors-but-notclassmates/ [https://perma.cc/5GV5-GWEX].
226
Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-6\CRN601.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 43

21-NOV-18

PREFERENCING EDUCATIONAL CHOICE

15:00

1401

lege; the real privilege is “not having to choose” a school.227 In
other words, choice can be a burden that does not necessarily
include a benefit.
As studies have consistently shown, both charter and private schools are extremely diverse in their quality. 228 About
one in five charters outperform their local public school and
almost two in five underperform.229 In Broward County, the
bottom end grew so much that it produced an inordinate number of charter closures. Of the entire state’s charter school
closures since 2014, 20% occurred there even though only 10%
of students live there.230 In short, while charters may increase
opportunity for some, they apparently decrease it for others. In
doing so, they further stratify the opportunities that students
receive within a single school district.
C. Segregating Opportunity
Choice can also have the effect of segregating various demographic groups to particular sectors of the overall school universe and treating them unequally. The segregative effects of
charters and vouchers on the whole is muddled because the
effects vary so much by state and region,231 but their segregative effect is strong and clear in particular states and districts.
A recent study of North Carolina, for instance, revealed that its
entire charter school sector was becoming increasingly white
while its public-school sector was increasingly populated by
students of color. That such a trend would occur on a statewide level is somewhat shocking, but likely a response to the
state’s particular strong history of integration in the past.
227

Id.
See, e.g., BRUCE D. BAKER, EDUC. POL’Y RESEARCH UNIT, PRIVATE SCHOOLING IN
THE U.S.: EXPENDITURES, SUPPLY, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2009) (comparing spending variations between public and private schools); CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC.
OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES (2009)
[hereinafter MULTIPLE CHOICE] (surveying charter school performance in sixteen
states).
229
MULTIPLE CHOICE, supra note 228, at 45–47.
230
Calculations derived from this database: FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FLORIDA CHARTER SCHOOL LIST BY DISTRICT (2017), http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/informa
tion/charter_schools/directory/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/NF3C-BV9P].
231
Compare ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT
EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS
(2010) (concluding that charter schools experience severe levels of racial segregation compared to public schools) with Gary Ritter et al., A Closer Look at Charter
Schools and Segregation, EDUC. NEXT (2010), https://www.educationnext.org/acloser-look-at-charter-schools-and-segregation/ [https://perma.cc/MT8X-SJY6]
(concluding that charter schools only experience slightly more levels of racial
segregation compared to public schools).
228
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Charter schools provide an exit or dissent option for that system. As the study’s author wrote, charter schools “are increasingly serving the interests of relatively able white students in
racially imbalanced schools.”232
District-level data in other states is equally troubling.
School segregation is increasing dramatically in the Twin City
metropolitan area of Minnesota. While some of the segregation
stems from the district boundaries and assignment policies,
charter schools are exacerbating it. In 2013–14, the metropolitan area had 131 charter schools.233 More than 80% were
segregated by race, socioeconomic status, or both.234 A third
had populations that were 95% or more minority.235 One-fifth
were predominantly white.236 In other words, half the charter
schools in the area were segregated by race.
As Newark data reveals, however, segregation and inequality can run much deeper than just race. Segregation and inequality between Newark’s traditional public schools and
charters occur on multiple levels. African Americans are increasingly leaving for charters, while Latinos remain. The Latino population in charters is less than half of that of public
schools, while African American enrollment in charters is 60%
higher than in public schools.237 Charters are also enrolling
significantly lower percentages of higher cost students than
public schools. Charters’ English language learner, special education, and low-income populations are substantially
smaller.238 In short, the type of segregation that would be decried if it was occurring within public schools is now occurring
between the traditional and charter sectors.
III
STATES’ BASIC EDUCATION DUTY
Whether charter and voucher programs violate state or federal constitutions has long been the subject of litigation and
scholarly interest. State constitutions, in particular, include a
232
Helen F. Ladd et al., Abstract, The Growing Segmentation of the Charter
School Sector in North Carolina (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 21078, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21078.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7TXE-GAGR].
233
Class Action Complaint at ¶ 29, Cruz-Guzman v. Minnesota, (D. Minn.
Nov. 5, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/minnesota-complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4RG-8YCG].
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
WEBER & RUBIN, supra note 61, at 12.
238
Id. at 4–6.
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robust set of state duties and quality and equity principles that
the expansion of charters and vouchers implicate. Prior litigation and scholarship, however, has yet to provide any theory
that would place serious limits on their growth. That failure
stems from the fact that the earliest challenges were speculative. They sought to block the choice programs before they
were even implemented. As a result, they had no means of
demonstrating the practical and nuanced impacts of choice on
the public education system. Compounding the problem, most
litigation has simply claimed too much, seeking to absolutely
block charters and vouchers. Courts were faced with all or
nothing claims and were reluctant to block innovation without
first understanding its effects. The following sections provide
an overview of relevant constitutional principles and prior
claims’ use of them.
A. State Constitutional Rights and Duties in Education
A right to education and states’ duty to deliver it are embedded in all fifty state constitutions.239 While many state supreme courts have refused to enforce these rights and duties,
reasoning that separation of powers concerns precluded
them,240 a majority of courts have.241 The late 1980s, in particular, marked a turning point, as the legal interpretations of
education rights and duties became more precise and the
means of measuring them more certain. 242 In twenty-seven
239
The official number of state constitutions imposing an education duty or
right has varied between forty-nine and fifty over the past half century because of
Mississippi’s constitutional vacillations due to changes to Mississippi’s Constitution. Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 10
(2016).
240
Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA.
L. REV. 701, 746 (2010) (discussing judicial outcomes and finding that one-third
dismiss school finance cases based on separation of powers concerns).
241
Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1500–05 (2007) (discussing
the results in state cases and the substantive meaning of the constitutional right
to education in those cases).
242
An oft-cited turning point was the Kentucky Supreme Court decision in
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). There, the court
painstakingly detailed the meaning of an adequate education. Id. at 212. The
decision served as a benchmark for courts in several other states. See, e.g., Op. of
the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 165–66 (Ala. 1993); Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ.
Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 734 (Idaho 1993); McDuffy v. Secretary of
Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255
(N.C. 1997); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999).
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cases between 1989 and 2006, plaintiffs prevailed nearly 75%
of the time.243
The cases typically challenge state funding systems and
the quality of education they produce, but the issues raised
include vast aspects of the education system. Courts have
been asked to resolve disputes ranging from teacher quality
and school facilities to segregation, teacher tenure, preschool,
and student expulsions.244 The cases largely turn on the specific nature of the education right or duty, as interpreted by the
court, and the structural and practical implications of the right
or duty.
Although the two are not mutually exclusive, scholars and
courts have tended to lump the cases into two categories: equity and adequacy.245 Pure equity claims are simple enough,
arguing that unequal access to education resources or opportunities violate the state education clause.246 An equity claim
might challenge the fact that the financing of education
through local property taxes results in some districts spending
$10,000 per pupil while neighboring districts spend $7,000.
More sophisticated equity claims focus on ensuring students
receive sufficient resources to equal outcomes.247 A system
that provided the exact same resources to low-income and middle-income students would violate equity because low-income
students need more resources to achieve the same level.248
Adequacy claims, in contrast, focus on identifying a baseline of quality educational opportunities that a state must provide. Various state constitutions indicate that the state must
deliver “efficient,” “thorough,” or “sound basic” education.249
243

Rebell, supra note 241, at 1527.
See, e.g., Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)
(teacher tenure); Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (segregation); Doe v.
Superintendent of Schs., 653 N.E.2d 1088 (Mass. 1995) (expulsion); see also
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 308–10 (1999)
(noting that present education funding litigation revolves around the right to an
adequate education).
245
See generally Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 483–521 (2014) (surveying and comparing equity
cases with adequacy cases).
246
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971); Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977).
247
Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 513–19 (1995) (arguing that student outcomes, rather
than nominal dollars, should be the focus of the equal education inquiry).
248
Id. at 519.
249
GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. I (“an adequate public education”); OHIO
CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“The general assembly shall make such provisions . . . as . . .
will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the
244
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Focusing squarely on these qualitative descriptions, courts
have held that state constitutions guarantee students access to
a quality or an “adequate” education.250 Plaintiffs then demonstrate violations with evidence that students are failing to meet
the state’s academic standards and that the state fails to provide students with the resources necessary to meet these
benchmarks.251
Whether focusing on adequacy or equity, the goal of litigants has been to place the education obligation on the state
itself, not local communities. As to this point, state constitutions are quite clear, articulating education rights and duties
as a first-order obligation of the state. The most aggressive
state constitutions provide that education is the “primary,”
“paramount,” or most important obligation of the state,
whereas others simply describe it as an obligation the state
“shall” discharge.252 These constitutional phrases and judicial
interpretations of them have established that although the
practical responsibility for delivering education is delegated to
districts, the ultimate constitutional responsibility for education remains with the state.253 This requires not only that the
state provide necessary financial and other resources, but also
that it establish standards and policies designed to ensure the
proper implementation of those resources. In other words,
courts have mandated that the state adopt education policies
State[.]”); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“a thorough and efficient system of free
schools”).
250
See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y.
2003) (noting that children have the right to an “adequate” education); Hoke Cty.
Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 373 (N.C. 2004) (noting that students are
entitled to a “sound basic education”).
251
See, e.g., Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 425–30 (N.J. 1997)
(discussing achievement on standardized state tests and its relevance to the constitutionality of the school system); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No.
95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *10–11 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000), aff’d in
part as modified, rev’d in part, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004) (analyzing student
performance on standardized state tests and curriculum).
252
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“[a] general diffusion of knowledge and
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people”) (emphasis added); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“paramount duty of the state”);
GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. I (“shall be a primary obligation of the State”); NEV.
CONST. art. XI, § 6 (requiring education to be funded before any other programs
are funded); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of
virtue among the people, being essential to the preservation of their rights and
liberties, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to promote public
schools . . . .”) (emphasis added); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91
(Wash. 1978) (en banc) (“a paramount duty to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within the State’s borders, the constitution has created a ‘duty’ that is supreme, preeminent or dominant”) (footnote omitted).
253
See sources cited supra note 252.
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to guide local districts in carrying out their delegated duties
and oversight standards by which the state can hold local districts accountable.254
B. Specific Constitutional Dictates and Provisions
Beyond these broad concepts of equity or adequacy, courts
have applied more precise constitutional concepts and structures. First, most state constitutions include a provision that
creates a common fund for public education.255 Those provisions often limit the programs on which those funds can be
spent and the precise manner in which the state should distribute the funds among school districts.256 Second, many
state constitutions establish a state superintendent or board of
education and articulate their specific powers and responsibilities.257 In common fund and state officer and board cases,
adequacy or equity concepts are beside the point. The question
is simply whether the state is following specific constitutional
rules.
Third, numerous state constitutions mandate a “system”258 of education, “uniform”259 opportunities and systems,
or “common” schools. Logic dictates that these provisions prohibit randomized, completely diverse, unsystematic or locally
independent educational opportunities.260 Yet, absolute uniformity is equally implausible. Thus, these phrases require
interpretation to determine how uniform schools must be and
in what respects. For instance, a system of education might
permit diverse educational opportunities so long as its whole
represented a comprehensive system.
254
See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13
(Ky. 1989) (holding that the State was responsible for providing a uniform set of
educational policies); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 52 (N.Y.
2006) (noting the State’s responsibility to ensure public schools teach “basic
literacy, calculating, and verbal skills”); see also Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822
N.E.2d 1134, 1157 n.35 (Mass. 2005) (noting that proposed remedies addressed
only funding and not the “failing administrative and financial management”).
255
See JOHN MATHIASON MATZEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE REGARDING EDUCATION AS REVEALED BY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 1776–1929, at 129–35 (1931)
(surveying state constitutions).
256
Id.
257
Id. at 4–14, 36–51.
258
See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 205 (noting the General Assembly had an
“obligation . . . to provide for a system of common schools”).
259
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
260
See Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 69–71) (discussing states’
uniform systems of education).
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Fourth, regardless of how one interprets phrases like uniform, the state’s obligation to provide the system inherently
includes a responsibility to engage in administrative planning
and oversight. The Kentucky Supreme Court, for instance, indicated that the state’s duty to deliver an efficient education
required the state to implement, control, and maintain the education system.261 Operating on similar logic, other courts have
indicated that the state must set academic standards and goals
tailored toward delivering the constitutionally required education and supervise the implementation of these standards. 262
A state might delegate certain implementation tasks to school
districts, but the state retains the duty to monitor local conditions to ensure its obligation is met.263 It cannot leave local
districts to sink or swim.
Fifth, courts have recognized that a properly planned and
managed education system would not just oversee local districts; it would ensure those districts have the resources to
meet the constitutional or statutory requirements, or both.
This can mean identifying the actual cost of delivering an equitable or adequate education, which entails breaking the cost
into its constituent components of student need, school district
need, and local funding capacity.264 To be clear, creating a
funding system that ensures student needs are met is not an
exact science, but the state must, as the Kansas Supreme
Court wrote, develop a funding system that “is reasonably calculated” to allow students to meet state standards.265
Cutting against most of these constitutional principles,
however, is the judicial recognition that state legislatures retain a great deal of discretion in how they discharge their duties.266 More specifically, education claims and remedies
always operate within the context of separation of powers constraints.267 Some courts refuse to even entertain plaintiffs’
261

See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 208.
See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 247–48 (Conn.
2010) (holding that the state must set academic standards).
263
See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212–14; Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294
(N.J. 1973); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
264
See Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 938 (Kan. 2005) (“[A] determination of
the reasonable and actual costs of providing a constitutionally adequate education is critical.”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 551 (Mass. 1993);
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 60 (N.Y. 2006).
265
Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1236–37 (Kan. 2014).
266
See generally William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance
Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1252–64 (2003) (surveying state
supreme courts’ decisions); Bauries, supra note 240, at 748–55 (same).
267
See Bauries, supra note 240, at 736–40 (surveying state constitutions).
262
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claims, reasoning that doing so encroaches on legislative discretion.268 Even when courts intervene, courts are careful to
not dictate policies and standards to the state.269 For instance,
a court might declare an education funding system inadequate,
but refrain from specifying what the state should do to remedy
it.270 When more than one reasonable solution exists, courts
indicate that it is the state’s province, not the court’s, to exercise discretion.271 And once states implement a remedy, courts
have often applied a standard of review akin to reasonableness
in evaluating the remedy.272
C. Prior Constitutional Challenges to Choice Programs
1. Charter Schools Cases
Plaintiffs have attempted to use the forgoing constitutional
provisions to block the creation of charter schools and voucher
programs. Most are predicated on the notion that charters and
vouchers are inherently inconsistent with the state’s constitutional structure for education. In regard to charters, plaintiffs
have raised two major categories of claims—one arguing that
charters are not public schools and the other that if charters
are public, they must be subject to the same state oversight as
traditional public schools.
The question of whether charters are public, or some other
alternative category of schools, affects any number of constitutional constraints. Most notable are the mandates that states
establish “common” or “public” schools and that they only
spend education funds on common or public schools. If char268
See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 160–61 (Ga. 1981); Comm.
for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191–92 (Ill. 1996).
269
See generally Bauries, supra note 240, at 729 (“In neither case, though, do
judges dictate policy choices[.]”).
270
Id. at 741; see also McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 232 (Wash. 2012)
(refusing “to specify standards for staffing ratios, salaries, and other program
requirements”).
271
See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 59–60 (N.Y.
2006) (examining whether the state’s education budget is “not unreasonable”);
Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 397 (N.C. 2004) (“[T]here is a
marked difference between the State’s [conceding] a need to assist ‘at-risk’ students prior to enrollment in the public schools and a court order compelling the
legislative and executive branches to address that need in a singular fashion.”);
McCleary, 269 P.3d at 231–32 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d
71, 91 (Wash. 1978)).
272
See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 861 N.E.2d at 59 (upholding state’s
plan because it was not “unreasonable”). See also Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 584, 606 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (indicating disparities need only be reduced to
insignificant levels and that many inequities are subject to only rational basis
review).
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ters are not public schools, the constitution would presumptively prohibit the state from creating or funding charters
through typical means.273 Another variant on these claims is
that even if charter schools are public, they are not part of the
public education system. Or if they are part of the public education system, they add a serious element of non-uniformity to
the system.274
With the exception of the Washington Supreme Court, high
courts have rejected these challenges,275 and Washington itself
is partly a product of unique prior precedent narrowly defining
the meaning of a common school.276 The courts refuse to adopt
a technical or limited definition of common or public schools,
reasoning that charters are public because states have labeled
and funded them as such.277 And, the fact that charters add
variation among public schools does not negate the fact that a
public education system exists.278 In short, whether charter
schools violate the constitutional duty to create and fund public education turns largely on courts’ willingness to treat “public” and “common” as terms of art with closely delineated
boundaries. Most courts have refused to do so.
273
See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. State, 355 P.3d 1131, 1139–40
(Wash. 2015) (explaining that the Washington Constitution “directs the legislature to establish and fund common schools and restricts the legislature’s power to
divert funds committed to common schools for other purposes even if related to
education”).
274
See Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 752–53 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999).
275
See, e.g., id. (holding that charter schools are public schools because the
legislature defined them as such); Sch. Dist. of Kan. City v. State, 317 S.W.3d
599, 601–02 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (holding that the state’s creation of charter
schools was “not unauthorize[d]”); Utah Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Utah State Bd. of
Educ., 17 P.3d 1125, 1129–30 (Utah 2001) (“The legislature has plenary authority
to create laws that provide for the establishment and maintenance of the Utah
public education system. This includes any other schools and programs the
legislature may designate to be included in the system.”).
276
See Sch. Dist. No. 20 v. Bryan, 99 P. 28, 30 (Wash. 1909) (defining common
schools in the absence of any prior legislative definitions).
277
See, e.g., Wilson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752 (explaining that charter schools
are public because the legislature defined them as such); Sch. Dist. of Kan. City,
317 S.W.3d at 602 (explaining that charter schools are public schools because the
legislature defined them as such); In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application, 753
A.2d 687, 691 (N.J. 2000) (“The choice to include charter schools among the array
of public entities providing educational services to our pupils is a choice appropriately made by the Legislature so long as the constitutional mandate to provide a
thorough and efficient system of education in New Jersey is satisfied.”); State ex
rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 N.E.2d 1148,
1158–59 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the General Assembly had the power to create
charter schools so long as the charter schools were funded as traditional public
schools).
278
See State ex rel. Ohio, 857 N.E.2d at 1158–59.
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The second set of constitutional challenges focus on the
state’s supervision and control of charter schools.279 The claim
here is a technical one: the wrong person or persons are supervising charters. Charter statutes that place them outside the
authority of state and local superintendents and school boards
infringe on constitutional authority of these officers and
boards.280 They might also preclude the state from discharging
its constitutional duty to supervise and control public
schools.281
Courts, save one exception, have rejected these arguments,
reasoning that charters remain under the authority of the state
legislature.282 The legislature created the statutory structure
in which charters operate and the legislature can alter that
structure any time it wishes.283 The fact that the legislature
currently affords charters more discretion than traditional
public schools is of no accord. Courts have further noted that

279
See, e.g., Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d
933, 938–40 (Colo. 2004); Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty. v. Fla. Charter Educ.
Found., 213 So.3d 356, 360–61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017); Council of Orgs. v.
Engler, 566 N.W.2d 208, 215–17 (Mich. 1997); Utah Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 17 P.3d at
1129–30.
280
See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 213 So.3d at 360 (charter school
statute’s administrative appeal provision did not violate local school boards’ authority under state constitution to operate, control, and supervise all free public
schools in school districts, and thus, provision was facially constitutional); State
ex rel. Ohio, 857 N.E.2d at 1161–63 (holding that the Charter Schools Act does
not unconstitutionally usurp local school district supervisory authority by creating public charter schools exempt from local supervision); League of Women Voters v. State, 355 P.3d 1131, 1136 (Wash. 2015); Wilson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
753–54; see also Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cty. v. Acads. of Excellence, Inc., 974 So.2d
1186, 1193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (same).
281
See Wilson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754 (reasoning that the Charter Schools Act
does not preclude the state from discharging its duties because “an overarching
purpose of the charter school approach is to infuse the public school system with
competition in order to stimulate continuous improvement in all its schools”).
282
See, e.g., Council of Orgs., 566 N.W.2d at 216; State ex rel. Ohio, 857
N.E.2d at 1161–63; Utah Sch. Bds. Ass’n, 17 P.3d at 1129–30. The only exception
is a relatively minor decision in Bd. of Educ. v. Booth, 984 P.2d 639 (Colo. 1999).
That decision hinged on a unique constitutional provision that specifically vested
substantial control over education decisions in local school boards. Id. at 648.
The court reasoned that the state board infringed on that local control by forcing
the local board to approve a charter. Id.
283
See, e.g., Council of Orgs., 566 N.W.2d at 219–21; In re Grant of Charter
Sch. Application, 727 A.2d 15, 33–34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Utah Sch.
Bds. Ass’n, 17 P.3d at 1129–30 (“The legislature has plenary authority to create
laws that provide for the establishment and maintenance of the Utah public
education system. This includes any other schools and programs the legislature
may designate to be included in the system.”).
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charters are not free from all oversight; charter authorizers
have the power to deny and terminate charters.284
The remainder of charter claims has avoided constitutional
issues, instead focusing on ensuring that charters and authorizers comply with existing statutes.285 These claims cover a
large spectrum of issues involving the merits of individual
charter school applications and the processes and standards
for approving them. A statute might, for instance, require an
assessment of the community’s need for a charter or the economic impact of a new charter on a local district.286 Charters
approved without these assessments are vulnerable to revocation. Plaintiffs have been more successful in these types of
cases.287 And the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that
certain statutory charter approval mechanisms are necessary
to ensure that the creation of charters in particular locations
does not have the effect of depriving students of a constitutional education.288 With the exception of that case, however,
statutory victories in other cases do not represent a fundamental or constitutional limit on charter schools, just a directive to
follow the state’s already permissive rules.
2. Vouchers
Litigation challenging vouchers has followed a similar approach, challenging vouchers based on uniformity clauses and
whether the programs are impermissibly funded with public
284
See, e.g., Wilson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754–55 (describing the charter authorization and revocation process); Council of Orgs., 566 N.W.2d at 216 (noting
that “a charter may be revoked any time the authorizing body has a reasonable
belief that grounds for revocation exist”).
285
See, e.g., Shelby Sch. v. Ariz. State Bd. of Educ., 962 P.2d 230, 237 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1998) (discussing the statutorily required protocol for resolving a dispute
between a charter and its authorizer); Bd. Of Educ. v. Bd. of Trustees, 282 A.D.2d
166, 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (discussing the school board’s argument that it is
entitled to the funds reserved for it by statute and the charter school act infringes
upon the school board’s statutory right to those funds).
286
See, e.g., Orange Ave. Charter Sch. v. St. Lucie Cty. Sch. Bd., 763 So. 2d
531, 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing a charter school’s failure to undertake tests required by its charter); Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 59
v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 740 N.E.2d 428, 432–34 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (noting that a
proposed charter school must be “economically sound”).
287
See Orange Ave. Charter Sch., 763 So. 2d at 533 (finding that the school
board had “good cause” to reject a charter school application because it conducted a voluminous evidentiary hearing); Martin, supra note 12, at 91–95 (surveying cases).
288
In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application, 753 A.2d 687, 698 (N.J. 2000) (“In
sum, we hold that the Commissioner must consider the economic impact that
approval of a charter school will have on a district of residence when during the
approval process a district makes a preliminary showing that satisfaction of the
thorough-and-efficient education requirements would be jeopardized.”).
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school resources.289 Voucher uniformity challenges have not
been any more successful than charter uniformity claims.
Courts reason that the public education system remains in
place and voucher programs rest outside it.290 In other words,
plaintiffs are free to challenge the uniformity of the public education system, but a voucher program does not necessarily
speak to that issue. Indiana emphasized, for instance, that the
state constitution obligates the state to both encourage education through all suitable means and set up a uniform education
system.291 Those two duties are not mutually exclusive and
thus, do not preclude vouchers.292 Other courts have offered
similar rationales in rejecting uniformity challenges to
vouchers.293
Attacking the source of voucher funding has been successful in a few states.294 Florida’s constitution, for instance, mandates a “uniform . . . and high-quality system of free public
289
See, e.g., La. Fed’n of Teachers v. State, 118 So. 3d 1033, 1050–52 (La.
2013) (holding the state’s funding of a voucher program to be impermissible);
Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886, 901–03 (Nev. 2016) (explaining that the state’s
voucher program could be permissible, but not under the appropriation scheme
used); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 627–28 (Wis. 1998) (applying the
court’s interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitution’s uniformity clause); see also
Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling:
Examining Voucher Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 703, 714–27 (2015) (surveying voucher cases).
290
See Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1221–25 (Ind. 2013); see also
Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 209 (Ohio 1999) (holding that school
voucher systems are a “general government program” (citation omitted)).
291
Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1221–25.
292
Id.
293
See, e.g., Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 896 (holding the state constitution’s uniformity clause only implicated funds within the public school system); Hart v.
State, 774 S.E.2d 281, 289–90 (N.C. 2015) (holding that the uniformity clause
applies to the public school system and does not prevent the legislature from
funding private initiatives); Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 473–74 (Wis. 1992)
(holding that the uniformity clause requires public education, and vouchers are
simply an attempt “to do more than that which is constitutionally mandated[,]”
not less).
294
See, e.g., Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 407–08 (Fla. 2006) (holding
voucher statute unconstitutional); La. Fed’n of Teachers, 118 So. 3d at 1062
(same); Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 902 (holding voucher statute unconstitutional because it failed to properly appropriate funds); Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents,
Teachers & Students, 92 P.3d 933, 943–44 (Colo. 2004) (holding that a legislative
scheme that requires school districts to pay a certain amount of money to parents
of students attending underperforming schools so that said parents can use that
money to pay tuition at nonpublic schools is an unconstitutional violation of the
school finance provision). Plaintiffs have also won based on constitutional provisions preventing public funds from flowing to religious institutions, but those are
distinct from the issues raised in this paper. See, e.g., Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d
1178, 1183–84 (Ariz. 2009). Those court decisions are also on weak footing following a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision limiting states in their ability to
exclude religious groups from participating in certain public funding programs.
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schools,”295 and its statutes earmark particular taxes to fund
the public school system. In 2002, the legislature took funds
directly from those public school revenues and diverted them to
vouchers.296 The state supreme court held that the diversion
of these funds was unconstitutional because those funds were
reserved for the provision of a uniform and adequate public
education system and could not be used to create an alternative voucher system.297
More recently, the Nevada Supreme Court noted a similar
problem with the state’s voucher program. While Nevada’s program did not violate the uniformity clause, the program violated constitutional funding rules.298 The state constitution
makes public education funding priority number one.299 The
state, however, had taken money from public education and
diverted it to vouchers without first having established that all
of public education’s needs would be met.300
It is also worth noting that state constitutional prohibitions
on the flow of public money into religious institutions once
provided a clear limit on the type of schools that could accept
vouchers.301 Those prohibitions, however, may no longer be of
practical import. First, states have used tax credit schemes to
avoid the problem.302 Second, a recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision suggests that state laws directly excluding religious
institutions from funding programs may be unconstitutional.303
The advent of these tax credit schemes, moreover, may
undercut the basic education clause claims as well. To the
extent that the problem in Florida and Nevada was the source
of the funds, tax credit schemes may resolve the problem. In
fact, the Florida Supreme Court has already held as much.304
Given that states have increasingly moved toward this model of
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2024–25 (2017).
295
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
296
Bush, 919 So. 2d at 408–09.
297
Id.
298
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 902 (holding that public schools must be funded
prior to appropriating funds to the state voucher program).
299
Id.
300
Id.
301
See, e.g., Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d
461, 474 (Colo. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (remanding case back to
Colorado Supreme Court).
302
Levin, supra note 10.
303
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25
(2017).
304
Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 408–09 (Fla. 2006).
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funding vouchers, the cases in Nevada and Florida may be of
little precedential value. In short, constitutional challenges
raised thus far have provided little if any practical limit on the
expansion of voucher programs.
3. Flaws of Prior Claims
Prior litigation, on the whole, has been a failure. Even the
rare victories have been cut short by legislative workarounds.305 The flaw of the litigation may be that it simply
claims too much—that state constitutions prohibit charters
and vouchers entirely. If courts accepted the claim that charters were not public schools, for instance, constitutional doctrine could preclude them entirely. Likewise, if courts accepted
the notion that vouchers necessarily operate at the expense of
public schools, constitutional doctrine would likely preclude
them.
Stances of these sorts are ones courts are loath to make,
particularly when they can avoid it. Courts have explicitly acknowledged that voucher and charter challenges draw them
into hotly contested political issues.306 Thus, courts have emphasized that their decisions are not about the academic merits of charters or vouchers themselves.307 Instead, courts
purport to base their decisions on constitutional doctrine
alone. Yet, the constitutional claims plaintiffs have raised
would end the political debate and foreclose states from pursuing policies that might very well prove academically beneficial
in some instances.308
305

Levin, supra note 10, at 1045.
Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1216 (Ind. 2013); State ex rel. Ohio
Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 N.E.2d 1148, 1166 (Ohio
2006); see also Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 755, 760 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999) (indicating the state was exercising its discretion to experiment in
uncharted territory).
307
Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 398 (“As a general rule, courts may not reweigh the
competing policy concerns underlying a legislative enactment. The arguments of
public policy supporting both sides in this dispute have obvious merit, and the
Legislature with the Governor’s assent has resolved the ensuing debate in favor of
the proponents of the program.”); Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1216 (“Our individual
policy preferences are not relevant. In the absence of a constitutional violation,
the desirability and efficacy of school choice are matters to be resolved through
the political process.”); League of Women Voters of Wash. v. State, 355 P.3d 1131,
1135 (Wash. 2015) (en banc).
308
See, e.g., John Bruno & Inez Feltscher Stepman, An “Unconscionable Decision”: League of Women Voters et al., v. State of Washington, AM. LEGIS. EXCH.
COUNCIL (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.alec.org/article/an-unconscionable-decision-league-of-women-voters-et-al-v-state-of-washington/ [https://perma.cc/
5KRJ-QGHV] (decrying the court for shutting down the policy debate in the state);
Wilson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760 (“[W]hile it is obvious that appellants wish for
306
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In this context, courts appear to construe the facts and law
more favorably to the state than they might in a typical adequacy or equity case. In doing so, they have permitted the
political process, rather than courts, to sort out the best way to
develop and manage choice programs. Two decades later, political support for school choice has penetrated so deeply that it
is hard to imagine courts reversing this course. 309 The train
has, so to speak, already left the station on the question of
whether state constitutions allow states to establish and fund
charter schools and voucher programs. Even if constitutional
logic would dictate otherwise, the judicial answer will be yes.
The question now is whether the constitutional debate over
school choice can be reframed from one premised on an all-ornothing approach to a more nuanced one that relates to how
choice programs actually affect the public education system.
Without this reframing, advocates need not waste their time in
court (save in states with idiosyncratic precedent). Fortunately, evidence like that developed in Parts I and II provide
strong evidence upon which to reframe the constitutional issues. This reframing, moreover, would allow courts to place
limits on choice programs without precluding them.310 Such
an approach is, likewise, consistent with school funding precedent, which includes very few absolutes and rests instead on a
close examination of how state policy affects educational opportunities in particular schools.
IV
THEORIZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF CHOICE
If any limit exists on choice programs, it is how they relate
to and affect educational opportunity in the public education
system. Prior claims have attacked choice as problematic in
and of itself, whereas this approach asks the same question
that all prior equity and adequacy litigation has: is the state
more—and more detailed—standards and guidelines, more could not be better in
this situation where a primary purpose of the Act is to encourage educational
innovation, experimentation and choice in order to improve learning and expand
learning opportunities for all students. How can you write the score to a symphony yet to be created?”).
309
See Minow, supra note 27, at 818 (analyzing the seductive allure of choice
programs).
310
The New Jersey Supreme Court offered a strong nod in this direction,
finding that the state’s charter school legislation was not unconstitutional on its
face, but the failure to diligently examine the effect of new charter schools on
segregation and the local delivery of thorough and efficient education opportunities could violate the constitution. In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application, 753
A.2d 687, 698 (N.J. 2000).
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delivering adequate and equitable educational opportunities?
If not, what policies are causing these deprivations? The state’s
motivations and rationale for its policies are irrelevant if the net
result is a failure to provide appropriate educational opportunities. A court might strike down the implementation of a charter
system and demand reform in the same way that it has struck
down state funding formulas and demanded that they be rewritten. In doing so, courts do not preclude any particular
form of school funding or school choice; courts simply demand
that the state’s chosen policies produce outcomes consistent
with the constitution.
To make this showing, however, claims must become far
more factually granular. Plaintiffs cannot assume that choice
programs inherently harm public education. They must show
it. This requires more than simply pointing to the competition
between traditional public schools and choice programs or the
rapid flow of resources into choice. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that choice programs are actually causing or are connected to inadequate or inequitable educational opportunities
in particular schools. Statewide data alone will not do this, as
choice programs remain relatively small at that level.311 But at
the district level, the facts developed in Part II strongly suggest
that negative effects of a constitutional dimension are
occurring.
While these negative effects offer the strongest claim, these
effects are not happenstance. States have created a statutory
structure that has incentivized rapid and unconstrained choice
growth.312 These incentives give rise to a second constitutional
claim: whether states’ motives are legitimate. Creating vouchers and charters to provide specialized or potentially improved
opportunities is one thing. Creating incentives to drive students away from public schools and toward an alternative is
entirely different. The creation of choice programs may amount
to no more than an alternative, which courts have generally
sanctioned as appropriate.313 But, alternatives that seek to
elevate or preference private choice in relationship to the public
education system are something else altogether. The state’s
311

REVENUES & EXPENDITURES 2007–08, supra note 217; REVENUES & EXPENDI2011–12, supra note 217.
312
See supra Part I (identifying and categorizing the advantages that states
have created from charter and voucher programs).
313
See generally Martin, supra note 12, at 91–94, 100–01 (cataloguing charter
cases); Mead, supra note 289, at 714–27 (cataloguing voucher cases); see, e.g.,
Wilson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760; Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1221–25
(Ind. 2013).
TURES
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objective might be illegitimate and be precluded by school finance precedent, if not explicit constitutional language. Because the preference helps give rise to the effects, the following
sections take up the former first.
A. A Prohibition on Preferencing Private Choice
Public education’s special constitutional standing offers
strong support for the principle that states are prohibited from
preferencing alternatives to the public education system. The
constitutional text and precedent in a great number of states
makes clear that education holds a priori status. Some constitutions and courts imply this status, emphasizing that education is “essential” to the preservation of democracy, a
“fundamental” right of the people, and a duty of the state.314
Others imply this status in the way they apply the constitution,
rejecting legislative whims and excuses as a basis for noncompliance with a state’s education duty.315 As noted earlier, several state constitutions are explicit, providing that public
education is the state’s “paramount,” “primary,” or first obligation.316 The Vermont Supreme Court may have best explained
just how special education is: “Only one governmental service—public education—has ever been accorded constitutional
status in Vermont.”317 In these states, legislation that prefer314
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge and
intelligence [is] essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the
people[.]”); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue
among the people, being essential to the preservation of their rights and liberties[.]”); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977) (recognizing a fundamental right); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 71 (Wash. 1978)
(same); Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo.
1980) (same).
315
Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 208 (Ky. 1989) (“[T]he
financial burden entailed in meeting [educational] responsibilities in no way lessens the constitutional duty.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744,
754 (N.H. 2002) (“[F]inancial reasons alone [do not excuse] the constitutional
command that the State must guarantee sufficient funding to ensure . . . a
constitutionally adequate education.”); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 798 A.2d
602, 603–04 (N.J. 2002) (rejecting state’s request for budgetary cap on education
to ease other constraints); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279
(Wyo. 1995) (“All other financial considerations must yield until education is
funded.”).
316
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“paramount duty”); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, ¶I
(“primary obligation”); NEV. CONST. art XII, § 6 (requiring the state to fund education before any other program); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 91 (“a paramount duty”); Campbell Cty., 907 P.2d at 1257–59 (“[The right to an education is]
a long cherished principle” that “was viewed as a means of survival for the democratic principles of the state.”).
317
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 391–92 (Vt. 1997). See also W. Va. Educ.
Ass’n v. Legis. of W. Va., 369 S.E.2d 454, 454–56 (W. Va. 1988) (emphasizing
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ences an alternative to public education should violate education’s a priori status.
Yet, even outside states with such clear language, logic still
dictates that states cannot preference alternatives to the public
education system. The provision of public education stands as
an absolute state duty. As such, states lack the authority to
directly or indirectly resist that duty. A refusal to fund public
education at all would directly violate the constitutional duty.
A legislative structure that indirectly sought or created the
means to eliminate public education should be equally unconstitutional. Consider, for instance, legislation that financially
incentivized every student in the state to opt for private education. While that program does not formally eliminate public
education, such a program could eliminate public education—
at least in certain locations. Even without a preference for
private education, simply placing private choice on an equal
playing field with public education treats choice not just as an
alternative to public education, but as an equal option. Full
equality between public education and private education renders the delivery of public education contingent on private
rather than public action. As such, the state is taking action
inconsistent with an absolute duty to provide public education.
In short, education’s special constitutional status logically requires that states put education ahead of other agendas.
That states cannot preference alternatives to public education would appear constitutionally uncontroversial. The more
difficult is what amounts to legislative action that consigns
education to second-class status. In addition to the examples
above, obvious examples include funding other lesser programs (like transportation or health) ahead of public education,
willingly failing to fully fund education needs, and cutting education in excess of or equal to other programs to balance the
state budget.318 Other examples are far more contextual. Prior
voucher and charter cases, for instance, have permitted choice
programs that rely on money that would have otherwise gone to
public education.319 While one could argue that shifting funds
from public education to choice negates education’s first-order
education’s preferred constitutional status in striking down the state’s acrossthe-board cuts to state programs).
318
See Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher
Shortages, and the Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U. L.
REV. 423, 431–47 (2016) (analyzing state funding priorities in relation to
education).
319
See, e.g., Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 756–57 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999); Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1221–25 (Ind. 2013).
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status, those funds follow students who are no longer in the
public schools.320 So long as the public schools retain necessary funding to serve their students, the funding shift is not per
se inconsistent with education’s first-order status. In these
circumstances, plaintiffs would need to show an educational
deprivation in the public schools themselves.
In contrast, the constitutional line of preference is seemingly crossed when the state not only expresses a willingness to
transfer funds to choice but also institutes policies that heavily
tilt the scales in favor of alternatives to the public education
system. In other words, the state does more than make alternatives to the public education system available; its legislative
scheme reveals that the state wants students to exercise those
alternatives and, in fact, may incentivize students to leave public education. The following sub-sections further explore what
these motives and incentives look like.
1. Motivational Preferences
A preference for choice over public education might be evident in two categories of cases. The first is when the legislature
expresses that preference or acts in response to a particular set
of circumstances that make that preference evident. The second category involves an assessment of choice programs in
relationship to public education to determine whether choice
programs operate with systemic advantages. In other words,
the first example is a question of legislative motive, and the
second is one of statutory effect.
While choice has garnered significant political capital, a
governmental preference for choice begs the question of governmental motive. From an institutional and constitutional
perspective, a government preference for private choice is antithetical. It is hard to posit a legitimate reason why government
would ever pass legislation that preferences options that would
detract from citizens’ access to their central constitutional right
to education. At least three unsavory explanations, however,
arise.
The first explanation is simply the state’s unwillingness to
meet its constitutional education duty. In other words, it is not
that the state prefers vouchers or charters, but that the state
does not want to live up to its education duty. By creating
320
For a charter advocate making that point, see NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER
SCHS., SEPARATING FACT & FICTION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CHARTER SCHOOLS
10 (2014), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Sepa
rating-Fact-from-Fiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5PA-ZYLH].
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alternatives to the public system, the state may shrink the
number of students to whom it owes a duty and obscure the
fact that it is not carrying out its public education duty. In
both instances, the state may also be shrinking the total funds
it spends on education—a related objective.
Evidence suggests that this is a significant motivation in
several states. Consider, for instance, that constitutional precedent requiring equal and adequate educational opportunities
was at a high-water mark immediately before the Great Recession.321 While states did not always readily comply, precedent
was steadily demanding that states increase their fiscal outlays
for public education.322 When the recession hit, states drastically cut their budgets for public education,323 likely committing a number of constitutional violations.324 Yet, it was during
that very period that states drastically expanded their financial
outlays for charter schools,325 which at the time produced perpupil savings for the state.326 In other words, states having
difficulty facing their increasing constitutional duties with
dwindling resources quickly moved the responsibility for educating a substantial portion of their students to third parties at
a lower price.
The possibility of ulterior motives with vouchers is older
and more obvious. During the 1990s, Ohio, for instance, was
facing two different serious legal challenges to the quality of
their public schools. A lengthy trial ensued, detailing extensive
qualitative and financial failings across the state.327 Based on
those facts, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the state’s
financing system was failing to ensure the constitutionally required “thorough and efficient” education opportunities. It ordered the state to “create an entirely new school financing
system;” recognize its duty to maintain a statewide system of
education; and “place [education] high in the state’s budgetary
priorities.”328 During the same time, a federal court found
Cleveland to be “among the worst performing public schools in
the Nation” and ordered the state to take control of the district
321

See Rebell, supra note 241, at 1476.
Id.
323
LEACHMAN ET AL., supra note 176, at 2.
324
Black, supra note 318.
325
See supra notes 204–221; Black, supra note 318, at 433–39.
326
See PATRICK J. WOLF ET AL., THE PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 6–7
(2014), http://www.uaedreform.org/downloads/2014/07/the-productivity-ofpublic-charter-schools.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LNB-X5BT].
327
DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997).
328
Id.

R
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to address what the court and state auditors termed an acute
“crisis.”329
In this context, the state enacted its first voucher program—one that would serve a select number of students.330
What the state did not do was fix the public education system.331 The state supreme court would declare the state’s legislative fixes insufficient and unconstitutional three more times
over the next five years.332 The most forgiving explanation was
that the state wanted vouchers to create immediate relief for
willing students. The other explanation is that the state was
not committed to providing systemic relief and enacted vouchers as a distraction and potentially a means of dividing the
constituency most affected by inadequate education.333
More recently, other states have promoted voucher expansion as a means of saving the state money. Curiously, a number of states already demonstrating a meager commitment to
public education in general lead that charge. Arizona and Nevada, for instance, operate some of the most underfunded and
inadequate education systems in the country.334 Yet, they
were the first to propose a radically new type of voucher program that would authorize shifting every student into a
voucher.335 Doing so could practically eliminate the state’s
public education responsibility. At the very least, it would, as
the primary proponents in Arizona emphasized, save the state
money over time.336 Once the students were in private education, the state could cap the voucher allotments and hold the
state’s investment in education at its already low levels.337 A
329

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
In Cleveland, 3,700 students received a voucher, which was roughly 5% of
the district’s population. Id. at 647. See also Enrollment Data, OHIO DEP’T OF
EDUC., http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Data/Frequently-Requested-Data/En
rollment-Data [https://perma.cc/D2EN-67BA] (last visited July 28, 2017).
331
McDonald, supra note 11, at 469 (noting that Ohio continues to experiment with choice but will not support public education system).
332
DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 747; DeRolph v. State, 699 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio
1998); DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1200 (Ohio 2001).
333
McDonald, supra note 11, at 473; see also Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out
Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1107–09
(2014) (analyzing why African Americans—a group heavily committed to public
education—would support vouchers and charters).
334
BAKER, supra note 156, at 7 fig.2.
335
See supra note 4.
336
Rob O’Dell & Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, School-Voucher Expansion Could
Cost Arizona $24M a Year or More, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 17, 2017), http://
www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona-education/2017/02/17/ari
zona-school-voucher-expansion-costs/97965256/ [https://perma.cc/8GJ8K55K].
337
Id.
330
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similar rationale has been offered in other states as a reason for
pushing vouchers for the states’ most costly students—students with disabilities.338
The second explanation for a state’s decision to preference
choice is that the public demands it. Yet, the public demands
it in many instances because the public education system itself
is inadequate. Exploring why African Americans in particular
have tended to support school choice options, Osamudia
James explained that “[f]or racial minorities, access to quality
public schools is not nearly as assured as it is for many white
students and their families.”339 African Americans have supported choice not as an inherently desirable policy but due to
the “lack of reasonable alternatives.”340
Public support borne out of the fact that the state is not
meeting its constitutional education obligations does not absolve the state in preferencing choice. This public support is
part of a vicious feedback loop in which the state’s unwillingness to provide adequate educational opportunities creates artificial demand for choice, which, if met, advantages the state
because it will no longer be on the hook for educating those
families. Absolving the state under these circumstances is
akin to absolving school boards that purported to segregate
schools, not because they were racist, but because their constituents demand it. In that context, courts flatly rejected the
state’s attempt to absolve itself.341
To be clear, however, public support for choice is not reserved to disadvantaged groups. Charter and voucher programs garner widespread support across various groups.342
Accounting for the broader support is more difficult. The
broader support raises the possibility of a third contributing
explanatory factor: groups other than the disadvantaged are
dissatisfied with public education. Embedded in this explana338

Raj, supra note 173.
James, supra note 333, at 1107.
340
Id.
341
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 553–54 (1996) (emphasizing the
court had rejected the idea that African Americans could be kept out of white
schools because they would face discrimination and making the same point in
regard to gender discrimination).
342
Kimberly Hefling, POLITICO-Harvard Poll: Americans Favor Charter
Schools—But Not at Public Schools’ Expense, POLITICO (May 3, 2017), http://
www.politico.com/story/2017/05/03/politico-harvard-poll-americans-favorcharter-schools-but-not-at-public-schools-expense-237940 [https://perma.cc/
9PYX-R3XC]; Paul E. Peterson et al., Ten-Year Trends in Public Opinion from the
EdNext Poll, EDUC. NEXT, Winter 2017, at 8, 10, http://educationnext.org/tenyear-trends-in-public-opinion-from-ednext-poll-2016-survey/ [https://
perma.cc/PTE6-7BQQ].
339
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tion is the more troubling possibility that, for many, support for
choice grows out of an anti-equality sentiment. In fact, school
choice initially developed as a direct response to school desegregation, as states and localities sought strategies to thwart the
process.343 School choice then faded, as desegregation itself
faded.344
Yet, the resurgence of choice roughly corresponds with the
overall increasing demands of equality in its various forms. 345
This is not to say that public schools provide equal educational
opportunity, but they are more equal now than before and
constitutional and statutory demands are higher. Equality,
however, presents a problem for the privileged. Equality can be
achieved by leveling disadvantaged students up or leveling advantaged students down. Both, however, entail the elimination
of advantages for formerly privileged groups.346 And eliminating relative status privilege exacerbates and intensifies demands for new forms of stratification.347 Ironically, when
advantaged classes feel safe in their status, they are more willing to be benevolent toward disfavored groups. But when that
status and privilege erode, “they are increasingly replaced by
new forms of status competition.”348
To the extent status conflict is occurring, choice programs
may placate it. They theoretically free middle-class families
from public schools that they either perceive to be qualitatively
inadequate or relationally too equalized. Choice also provides
two potential positive goods for the privileged: public financing
for private school costs that the privileged would have otherwise borne themselves and facilitating privileged groups who
otherwise would have attended more diverse public schools
343
See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 431–32 (1968); see also
WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: IMPLEMENTING Brown v. Board of Education 132 (Brian
J. Daugherity & Charles C. Bolton eds., 2008) (discussing response to school
desegregation); Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and
the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 730 (1986) (arguing that choice will
“perpetuate, not eliminate,” segregation).
344
See generally Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW U.
L. REV. 1157, 1161–87 (2000) (evaluating the decline in school desegregation).
345
See generally Minow, supra note 6, at 257 (revealing how choice came on
the heels of equality paradigms that had purportedly failed).
346
As Professor Jack Balkin explains, “One cannot increase the status of one
group without decreasing the status of another. High prestige is prestige over
others and in distinction to others. Increased respect for lower status groups
means a corresponding loss of respect for higher status groups because their
identity has been constructed around their greater prestige and the greater propriety of their ways of living.” J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE
L.J. 2313, 2328 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
347
Id.
348
Id. at 2333.
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into more heterogenous charter schools or voucher programs.
The former reinforces existing privilege, while the latter creates
new privilege.
Sorting out which of the foregoing motives are at play in
any given state is beyond the scope of this Article. But to the
extent any motivate the state to preference private choice over
public education, they represent likely constitutional violations. The point here is to recognize these motivations as such.
2. Preferential Effects
Regardless of states’ motivation, their statutory structure
might, as a practical matter, preference choice. Choice programs can entail such a systematic set of advantages that remaining in the public school system would be an irrational
choice for families to make.349 In other words, the question is
whether families faced with pursuing a voucher or remaining in
the public school would see the voucher program as practically
a better deal. Cleveland, again, offers an interesting context for
exploring this question.
When Cleveland’s traditional public schools were in crisis,
the monetary value of the voucher was still relatively small and
left families responsible for a portion of the tuition.350 This
likely made vouchers appealing to a relatively small subset of
students. Further complicating the choice was the fact that
many private schools would not accept the voucher—due either
to its low reimbursement rate or the students it would bring, or
both.351 This left private religious schools as nearly the only
ones in which students used vouchers.352 These facts would
suggest that even if the state held illegitimate motives (which it
may have), its voucher program did not create a significant
practical advantage for choice. On the other hand, simply
changing the value of the voucher could change this equation.
Far more students would have sought a voucher and far more
schools would have likely accepted them.
At some point, a practical preference for choice becomes
hard to distinguish from choice programs that undermine public education as a practical matter. The primary distinction is
that establishing a preference does not require a showing that
students in the public education system are being denied the
constitutionally required education. Yet, demonstrating a pref349
350
351
352

See, e.g., Black, supra note 128, at 460 n.92.
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002).
See id.
Id. at 647.
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erence still requires a comparative analysis between choice
programs and public education that draws on the same evidence as a claim premised on undermining public education.
In the interest of brevity, this Article turns to the undermining
claim, while reserving that those same facts might establish a
narrower preference claim.
B. Choice that Impedes the Delivery of Adequate and
Equitable Public Education
The conceptually and factually more direct challenge to
choice programs is that they impede the delivery of constitutionally required public education opportunities. Again, the
claim is not that charters or vouchers are per se barred, but
that as a practical matter, the state’s statutory structure for
choice programs is undermining public education. This claim
requires evidence of the precise effects of choice on public education in particular locations.
1. Existential Threats
The most salient challenges would demonstrate one of
three things occurring at the district level. First, evidence
might demonstrate that choice programs are creating an existential threat or systematically replacing public education in
particular districts, or both. A fallacy of prior approaches has
been to look at voucher and charter programs on a statewide
basis. At that level, however, their effect is diluted and misleading, and destructive claims about them overblown. Traditional public schools in most states still hold over 90% of the
education market.353 Including charters, every state’s public
education system holds 90% of the market.354 Thus, no statewide existential threat exists.
But at a local level, existential threats may very well exist.355 New Orleans, most notably, became a system entirely
353

REVENUES & EXPENDITURES 2007–08, supra note 217, at 77.
See BRUCE BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 25
(2d ed. 2012).
355
In Louisiana, for instance, charters are only about 10% of the overall public
school sector. Automatic Exemptions from Many State and District Laws and
Regulations, supra note 103. No matter what substantive critique one might offer
of charters or their effect on the overall public education system, it is hard to
argue that charters are undermining public education or violating other constitutional principles on a statewide basis in the state. The analysis might look quite
different at the local level. New Orleans, for instance, transitioned from a system
of traditional public schools to one that is now entirely comprised of charters.
Layton, supra note 1. Background precedent in Louisiana was unfavorable to a
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comprised of charter schools.356 Traditional public schools
simply ceased to exist. No other locality comes close to that
percentage of charters yet, but the upward trends in places like
Detroit, Flint, Philadelphia, and Newark indicate that it is a
possibility there.357 In fact, Detroit and Flint recently became
majority charter districts.358
At current enrollment levels, voucher programs fall short of
existentially threatening public education. Yet, recent statutory programs in places like Nevada and Arizona contemplate
that threat, authorizing every public school student to exit the
system.359 States cannot argue that these students are still
part of the public education system. Moreover, these new state
programs place even less oversight on voucher growth than
charter growth. The only real constraint is the willingness of
students and private schools to accept them.
For the state to carry out its constitutional obligations in
regard to public education, it has to maintain a public education system across all districts.360 Otherwise, traditional public education becomes a happenstance of where one lives,
rather than a constitutional guarantee.361 Likewise, the demise of traditional public schools means the demise of local
school boards, superintendents, and overall democratic control
of education, which several state constitutions specifically
mandate.362 Again, a state might permissibly create alternatives to public schools and even place them outside the oversight of state officers, but it cannot eliminate traditional public
schools and state oversight altogether. In short, statutory policies that, as a practical matter, eliminate public schools on a
systemic basis in particular jurisdictions are antithetical to the
proper discharge of the state’s duty.
constitutional challenge, but in another state, these facts could have easily lent
themselves to constitutional challenges.
356
Layton, supra note 1.
357
A GROWING MOVEMENT 2016, supra note 2, at 3; A GROWING MOVEMENT 2015,
supra note 206, at 3.
358
A GROWING MOVEMENT 2016, supra note 2, at 3.
359
See, e.g., supra notes 165–169 and accompanying text.
360
See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989)
(emphasizing the state’s duty in regard to the entire public school system).
361
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11–16
(1973) (detailing vastly different educational resources between districts separated by a very short distance); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 366–69 (Conn.
1977) (decrying the vast disparities in educational opportunity based on
geography).
362
See generally MATHIASON MATZEN, supra note 255, at chs. 2–3 (cataloguing
state constitutional clauses that provide for state school boards and
superintendents).
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2. Deprivations of Educational Opportunity
A milder version of the existential threat claim is that
choice policies are a causal factor in public schools failing to
deliver a constitutionally required education or falling even further below that threshold than they previously were. The claim
is not that public education will cease to exist in a district, but
that quality of education in the district persists at an inferior
level because of the effects of choice programs. This claim
closely mirrors a typical school quality or equity claim with the
only major distinction being the particular state policy causing
the constitutional deprivations.363
As detailed in subpart II.A, state support for public education has decreased significantly in number of states. That decrease, however, is concentrated and intensified in districts
with substantial choice programs. These districts have seen
per-pupil revenues in traditional public schools decline by 10%
to 20% in just a few years, which social science and even states’
own calculations indicate are sufficient to deprive students of
adequate and equal educational opportunity.364
The cuts represent the constitutional deprivation. The
next step is to identify the cause. To be clear, choice programs
are not entirely to blame for the deprivations. States have simply been willing to cut education to balance budgets in other
state programs. 365 But, choice programs are also a significant
cause of the deprivation in places like Newark and Columbus.
The statutory reimbursement system in those states actually
drives per-pupil funding in traditional public schools down
with each transfer to a charter.366 In addition, state decreases
in support for traditional public education have corresponded
with per-pupil funding increases for charters and vouchers in
several states. While the causal link is not as direct at that
level, the states are, in effect, taking money from traditional
public education and giving it to choice programs.
3. Breaching Equality, Uniformity, and Access Through
Stratification
Finally, choice programs that stratify educational opportunity within the overall universe of state-sponsored educational
opportunities produce another distinct constitutional violation.
363
See generally Black, supra note 22, at 114–22 (detailing a prima facie
school funding case and the causal analysis).
364
See supra note 17.
365
LEACHMAN, supra note 176.
366
See supra notes 204–11 and accompanying text.
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The stratification can manifest itself in a number of ways, but
typically involves random variations in educational opportunity
ranging from grossly inadequate to high quality. Racial-, ethnic-, and disability-based segregation also layer on top of this
quality stratification, raising additional concerns.
On the whole, the stratification might be evidence of a
number of different state constitutional violations. In states
that guarantee a baseline of qualitative educational opportunity, stratification may eviscerate that baseline for students at
the bottom. Take the worst-case example of charter closures in
Broward. The bottom fell so far that the state itself closed
several schools.367 But what of the charters that were just
short of closure or those that evidence reveals are performing
substantially below their local traditional public school counterparts? The state policies that created and incentivized these
schools pushed students into even worse situations and represent evidence that the state is simply no longer ensuring a
baseline of educational opportunity.
The state might defend on the grounds that students are
exercising choice in the educational opportunities,368 but the
fact remains that the state is not offering all students choices
that include access to quality education. A system of state-run
inadequate public schools has simply been replaced by a decentralized mix of public and private schools that are inadequate. The latter, however, is arguably more problematic
because the state has attempted to distance itself from the
problem and left students to fend for themselves.
In states with uniformity and strong equality guarantees,
stratification creates even more obvious violations. Whatever
the failings of the traditional public education system, the transition to a system of stratified opportunities exacerbates the
failings. Stratified opportunity necessarily entails more inequality among students, with some falling even further below
baseline opportunity and a select few rising well above. In the
367
Jacob Carpenter, Shuttered: Florida’s Failed Charter Schools, NAPLES DAILY
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2015), https://www.archive.naplesnews.com/news/education/
shuttered-floridas-failed-charter-schools-ep-595749183-336389581.html/
[https://perma.cc/Q837-LRFR].
368
See, e.g., Scott B. v. Bd. of Trs., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 173, 179 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013) (reasoning that an expelled student was not entitled to due process because
the charter school was a school of choice). The general idea of forfeiture has also
been used in school discipline cases. See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of Schs.,
653 N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (Mass. 1995); RM v. Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 102
P.3d 868, 874 (Wyo. 2004); See also Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism:
Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 207 (1995) (extolling that a
major virtue of choice is making individuals responsible for their own education).
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same respect, such a system becomes less uniform, with educational opportunity resting more on the luck of the draw than
any state guarantee. To be clear, however, this is not a facial
uniformity challenge as seen in prior litigation. Rather, the
theory here is that, as a practical matter, the state has exacerbated inequality and made schools less uniform.
School segregation, unfortunately, can layer on top of this
stratification in educational opportunity. Not only does the
stratification generally deprive students of adequate educational opportunities, data suggests it primarily deprives students in increasingly segregated schools of that opportunity.369
Moreover, the segregation itself further intensifies the
inadequacy.
Racial segregation, in particular, is educationally devastating because it is so often accompanied by socio-economic segregation.370 Research indicates that high-poverty schools
depress the academic achievement of all students who attend
those schools, regardless of their individual race or class.371 In
at least five major aspects—access to quality curriculum, access to qualified teachers, access to high-achieving peer
groups, graduation rates, access to later employment and
higher education—predominantly poor and minority schools
cause harm or deliver inferior educational opportunities to students.372 These problems are not ones money alone can easily
fix.373 They are the product of segregation itself.
Although the number of cases challenging segregation
under state education clauses are limited, existing precedent is
favorable. Most notably, the Connecticut Supreme Court held
369
ANURIMA BHARGAVA ET AL., NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND & CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT, STILL LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K–12 SCHOOL INTEGRATION 14
(2008).
370
See id.
371
See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 21–22 (1966); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL
TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE
47–76 (2001); Geoffrey D. Borman & Maritza Dowling, Schools and Inequality: A
Multilevel Analysis of Coleman’s Equality of Educational Opportunity Data, 112
TEACHERS COLL. RECORD 1201, 1201–02 (2010); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Segregation and the SAT, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 157, 157 (2006).
372
Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 405–09 (2012).
373
See id.; Jane L. David, Teacher Recruitment Incentives, EDUC. LEADERSHIP,
Apr. 2008, at 84, 85–86; Susanna Loeb et al., How Teaching Conditions Predict
Teacher Turnover in California Schools, 80 PEABODY J. EDUC. 44, 65 (2005); Wendy
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that racial segregation in public schools, even if unintentional,
produces harms that deprive students of their right to education. The New Jersey and California Supreme Courts have similarly recognized that segregation can violate students’
education rights.374
This precedent, along with the general principles of uniformity and equality developed in numerous other cases, suggest that the segregative trends developing in places like
Newark, Minneapolis, and North Carolina violate state education clauses. The self-sorting and stratification that choice
programs allow are a direct cause of segregation in these locations. The segregation itself may violate constitutions in some
states. In others, segregation causes inadequacy and inequality that violates students’ general education rights.
CONCLUSION
Charter schools and vouchers are here to stay. Courts and
public policy have made that clear. Polemic arguments against
their existence do a disservice to both choice programs and
traditional public education. Key questions regarding whether
any constitutional principles govern their co-existence get lost
in the polemics. Courts and legal scholars have, likewise,
failed to provide meaningful guidance on how best to implement choice.
This Article fills that void, focusing on how choice programs impact particular school districts and the constitutional
principles that apply. In particular, states’ constitutional duty
to deliver adequate and equal educational opportunities in
public schools creates two specific limits. States cannot preference private choice over public education, nor can states create
choice programs that, as a practical matter, undermine educational opportunities in traditional public schools.
The time for courts to formally adopt these principles is
now. Choice programs are rapidly expanding, imposing even
larger harms on public schools, and set to grow even more
under new federal proposals. Without constitutional limits, education may soon enter a new paradigm in which public education is no longer a guarantee in every community.
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